Turkey - Israel alliance and Arab policy towards Turkey
Turkey, a country of some 65 million people with an annual Gross National Product of some $400 billion (Purchasing Power Parity estimates), has said that it is embarking on a military alliance with Israel (population about 5 million people with a GNP of some $90 billion).
Having received strong and uniform criticism from the Arab States for the Turkish intention, Turkey announced that this alliance is "not" against any country in the region. Such a statement does not reflect the fact that all military alliances are born because of a perceived need and threat from an enemy or a potential enemy. Therefore Turkish assertions about the alliance with Israel, a country hostile to the Arab states, are not very credible.
Turkey has had great deal of tension in the past with Syria over water rights and Syrian support of Kurdish factions that Turkey views as terrorists. Turkey also has had similar problems with Iraq relating to water resources and the Kurds in the north of Iraq.
The answer as to why Turkey chose this time to embark on such a venture can be found in several areas. Turkey, an Islamic country and member of the Organization of Islamic Conference, has always been of two minds. The ruling class and the military have always aspired to be a Western country, as opposed to the eastern reality that governed Turkey's past.
Turkey's modern founding father, Kamal Ataturk, decided that the future lies ahead in Western ways, and embarked on implementing institutions toward that end. However, Turkey fell short of that because there were no major reforms of the country at the "individual" level to be supported by modern democratic institutions. This has manifested itself most recently by having Islamic parties, that hold traditional values, winning the elections. But the military, which yields great power, was unhappy with the result and in effect pushed the prime minister out of office.
The military, and the ruling class wanted badly to join the European Union. Turkey, a long time member of NATO because of its strategic location near the former Soviet Union, thought itself entitled to join the European Union due to this fact, and the fact that it is trying to be "Western." But Turkey was rebuffed by the European Union, for several reasons. Turkey still has a terrible human rights record and primitive democratic institutions. Also, Turkey is in a semi-state of war with Greece (an EU member) due to their dispute over the Island of Cyprus, which had resulted previously in wars.
Turkey's rejection by the European Union was a major psychological defeat, and was acknowledged as such by the Turkish government, for this was a long-time aspiration of Turkey, and much hope was pinned on it. Wanting to continue on a "Western" road, and without bringing its population along, Turkey saw the other Western power that it needed and can associate with, the USA. Immediately, Turkey escalated its activities in this regard, and talk of trade and closer coordination ensued with the USA. This, as we will see, is also of great benefit to the USA geo-political interests.
But the road to influence in Washington for some countries that want USA help has to go through Israel. As with Iran in the 60s and more recently in the 80s when Israel resold US weapons to Iran, and as with China now where the US is prohibited from selling advanced military technology to China, while Israel is given the green light (by congress) to do the selling itself, and as was done with South Africa when US sanctions were imposed, South Africa had no better friend with regard to its development of nuclear (now destroyed) and military equipment then Israel.
The US Congress by having laws that put sanctions against certain Arab-friendly or semi-friendly countries if they trade in advanced weapons, forces these countries to go through Israel. Israel, in effect, as history clearly demonstrates, has the greatest favor with the US Congress, to such an extent, that so long as you as a country ally yourself with Israel against the Arab states, then the congress will bestow its favors upon you.
The result is that the US Congress has a sign on its front door in effect saying: Don't worry about being a friend of the USA, just be a friend of Israel, especially if you oppose the Arab states, and everything will be just fine. Turkey, like others, understand this reality full well, and greater Turkish cooperation with Israel ensued.
There is one more factor driving this Turkish-Israeli alliance, and it is pivotal. The USA needs to maintain a balance of power in the area that is favorable to its goals. The US policy of "dual containment" against Iraq and Iran, two of the major military powers in the oil-rich Gulf region (some 70% of world oil resources) has failed. US officials have acknowledged this failure. Iran is rebuilding its military and industry and has enhanced its self-reliance for its needs dramatically.
Iraq, while less of a threat, remains a country with enormous natural and human resources that can be tapped quickly once Iraq is given the opportunity. Also, Iraq and Iran have come to understand that it is in their best interest not to be enemies. This failure of the US "dual containment" policy where the major Gulf region countries are prevented from having full control over their resources has led the US to rethink and focus on a new need to contain these countries along with Syria. US policy is always focused on oil and Israel, and they both reinforce each other at times.
Thus the need for a complimentary US policy to its failed "dual containment" policy. Thus, the need for a new alliance that will bring this balance of power back into USA's favor. Such an Israeli-Turkish alliance will be very effective for US and Israeli interests, as both countries will be capable of "squeezing" Syria, Iraq, Iran and extending their combined influence against Saudi Arabia, and other regional countries.
The effect of such an alliance can even be more successful if there is a lack of cohesion among the Arab states. As such, Jordan is being enlisted as a "cover" that this alliance is not against Arab states, since Jordan is an Arab state, and because Jordan is a weak link in the Arab chain due to its economic dependence on aid and fear of Israel's military. Jordan also does not mind hinting that it may join such an alliance as a leverage against Syria with which relations have not been smooth.
But Turkey is greatly miscalculating the current and future Arab response. There is a clear understanding that such an alliance, no matter how benign it seems at the moment, poses a great threat to all the Arab States. The dangers are clear and the ramifications are long-term. Once such an alliance takes hold, it will do untold damage to Arab states' interests. More money and resources will have to be wasted (as usual) on buying weapons to deal with this new threat, which will slow down the rate of political, social, and economic progress for the Arab states as a whole. Some Arab states may find temporary benefits from this alliance as the US dangles economic carrots to some in the hope that they will turn a blind eye, buying time for the alliance to develop. But the threat is clear.
This alliance must not be allowed to develop, and a comprehensive strategy should be developed to deal with it.
An Arab strategy with regard to the Turkish-Israeli alliance and with regard to Turkey in general is badly needed. Turkey can be (and should be) a friend or can be an enemy of the Arab states. This depends on Turkey's perceived needs for being a friend of the Arab states and on the Arab states succeeding in the implementation of such a policy. Let's look briefly at the dimensions of this policy.
Any such policy would have to account for several factors, such as economic, business to business, political, social (contacts and public communication with the large pro-Arab states groups), and military. Such a policy would need to account not only for Arab states's needs in general and in the future, but for the immediate need of some Arab states who do have economic interests in a relation with Turkey. While some Arab states would want to adopt tough measures and sanctions against Turkey, others would see less need for this at this stage. Between those two Arab views a policy must lie that would address the short-term and long-term goals of one and all.
A carrot and stick approach is best adopted, with the carrot being the large and growing Arab market that Turkey can access, versus the small Israeli market, and the stick being the large enemies that Turkey will develop and the other regional ramifications.
A policy of stick and carrot is much more likely to succeed than either a stick or a carrot alone. This approach will also, facilitate the implementation of such a policy, as it would allow those Arab states that have strong economic ties with Turkey to be the carrot, and the others to be the stick. But this Arab policy should be coordinated to be effective.
Iran, a regional power, is moving very positively to resolve problems and friction points, between it and the Arab states, that allow others to play the Arab states and Iran against each other. This should continue. Iran can and should be a strong ally to the Arab states. Differences should be ironed out, and there is no advantage in prolonging the resolution of such problems. That only plays to the hands of those who want to cause the region trouble. Relations with Iran are another factor to consider when thinking about this Turkish - Israeli alliance, and how Iran can be a close and genuine ally.
Lastly, Arab policy in general would be much more effective if their internal economies were stronger and there was much more inter-Arab economic trade, so that very strong economic leverage can be used against other countries when Arab interests in general are threatened as is the case with any Israeli-Turkish alliance.
If this alliance is not prevented in an effective matter from developing, the Arab states may face a monster that will once again attempt to prevent their development. The threat of such an alliance is too great to ignore, and too real for quick answers. A deliberate and thoughtful "common Arab policy" would be refreshing for once, as this is a long-term threat to every single Arab state's interests, without exception.
As in the past, those who are trying to undermine the Arab states' political and economic development will attack the Arab states, one country at a time, in such a manner that other Arab states do not see it as in their interest to face this threat. This goes on until it is the next Arab state's turn. One at a time, they are weakened over an interval of time, so that it is not very clear that the attack is against all of them. This is to prevent their economic development, which would bring with it real and effective power, and would liberate them to capitalize on the tremendous natural and human resources with which they have been endowed.
A policy that is developed without the full consideration of these factors in addition to others is less likely to be optimum.
Unlike Israel's boycott in the past where things where very black and white and the economic trade interests for the Arab states nonexistent, this Israeli-Turkish alliance, for the first time, presents the Arab states the opportunity to develop and practice their skills in coordinating foreign policy to face challenges to their collective interests.
Time and again, in the future, those Arab interests will be tested. Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia (Israel, regional, the African Horn), Egypt (Israel, African Nile river countries), etc... At these times, the threat is not likely to be high-level and obvious to the population in general, but rather low level, sustained, and strategic. In these cases the policies adopted by the Arab states in the past are very inadequate. The Arab states should always seek peace and friendship with their neighbors and others, but more importantly, the tools needed to achieve these goals in a practical sense needs to be mastered.
This is a test case to see if the Arab states are capable of developing policies that are not only for times of war or times of peace, but for the times ahead which are in between.