Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report: WMD in Iraq, evidence misrepresented, war not best option

A new study from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace "WMD IN Iraq, Evidence and Implications" said that the US officals misrepresented intelligence and facts to the American people and the world, and that war was not the best option to achieve the objectives.

The study detailed "what the U.S. and international intelligence communities understood about Iraq's weapons programs before the war and outlines policy reforms to improve threat assessments, deter transfer of WMD to terrorists, strengthen the UN weapons inspection process, and avoid politicization of the intelligence process,” the organization said.

The report “distills a massive amount of data into side-by-side comparisons of pre-war intelligence, the official presentation of that intelligence, and what is now known about Iraq's programs,” according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which presented a summary of the findings.

The report said that there were clear missrepresentaion of intelligence reports and facts to achieve polical goals.

The summary statement called for Changes to Threat Assessments by

“· Recognize distinctions in the degree of threat posed by the different forms of "weapons of mass destruction" - chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons pose vastly different risks and cost-benefit calculations of actions to combat them.

· Recognize red flags indicating that sound intelligence practices are not being followed.

· Examine and debate the assertion that the combined threat of evil states and terrorism calls for acting on the basis of worst-case reasoning.

· Examine assumption that states will likely transfer WMD to terrorists.”

The reports key finding were “Iraq WMD Was Not An Immediate Threat” and that:

“· Iraq's nuclear program had been suspended for many years; Iraq focused on preserving a latent, dual-use chemical and probably biological weapons capability, not weapons production.

· Iraqi nerve agents had lost most of their lethality as early as 1991.

· Operations Desert Storm and Desert Fox, and UN inspections and sanctions effectively destroyed Iraq's large-scale chemical weapon production capabilities.”

The report said “Intelligence Failed and Was Misrepresented,” and that:

“· Intelligence community overestimated the chemical and biological weapons in Iraq.

· Intelligence community appears to have been unduly influenced by policymakers' views.

· Officials misrepresented threat from Iraq's WMD and ballistic missiles programs over and above intelligence findings.

The report said “Terrorist Connection Missing,” and that:

“· No solid evidence of cooperative relationship between Saddam's government and Al Qaeda.

· No evidence that Iraq would have transferred WMD to terrorists-and much evidence to counter it.

· No evidence to suggest that deterrence was no longer operable.”

The report concluded “War Was Not the Best-Or Only-Option

· There were at least two options preferable to a war undertaken without international support: allowing the UNMOVIC/IAEA inspections to continue until obstructed or completed, or imposing a tougher program of "coercive inspections."

The report made recommendations to make intelligence not subject to political manipulation, and the proper assement to be to be the guide for decision makers, and not politics. It recomended “Revise the National Security Strategy to eliminate a U.S. policy of unilateral preventive war, i.e., preemptive war in absence of imminent threat.”

The report can be found at www.ceip.org/WMD