Israel's nuclear dilemma and program, part two
Regional-Israel, Military, 7/11/1998

The first part of this report examined the beginning and progressive efforts in France to help develop Israeli nuclear capability through the eyes of Israeli professor Yair Evron's 1994 book, "Israel's Nuclear Dilemma." Yair also disclosed that the nuclear issue is a main point of dispute among Israeli decision-makers.

Here, we try to present the author's opinion about the Israeli nuclear ambiguity policy and the benefits Israel has received from continuing this policy.

Until the late 1980s, Evron, says, official Israeli denials contributed to the maintenance of some degree of ambiguity concerning its actual nuclear weapons capability. However, Mordechai Vanunu's revelations and, more importantly, the emerging consensus among international experts analyzing history, have made Israeli denials less credible. Even so, these denials continue to play an important role. However, the deterrence effect of an ambiguous posture is probably weaker than that of an unambiguous one.

In fact, the majority of Israelis very successfully internalize the Israeli strategy of ambiguity. They distinguish between what they believe Israel has in terms of hardware and the uses to which such hardware could be put. Israelis are horrified by the whole issue of nuclear weapons, and therefore opt to ignore it altogether.

The lack of public debate contributes to an ignorance that leads to a straightforward acceptance of the official line that is disseminated through the media.

Evron explains the Arab position toward the Israeli nuclear ambiguity policy by saying that a measure of uncertainty still characterizes Arab perceptions about actual Israeli nuclear capability. Moreover, although decision makers and officials from several Arab states increasingly refer to Israel's nuclear capability as a justification for various policies they undertake, most Arab states still refrain from formulating explicit policies and strategies to deal with Israel's nuclear development.

It could be concluded that in terms of Arab reactions, the threshold status is still a useful definition describing Israel's nuclear posture.

Evron went on to make Arab approaches clear, saying that Arab approaches to the nuclear issue have clearly identifiable characteristics (with the exception of Iraq).

Arab nuclear policies are in main formulated in reaction to nuclear developments in Israel. But there exist substantial financial resources backing the advancement with the available technological and scientific infrastructure.

Generally speaking, the author added, the nuclear issue has not been perceived as sufficiently critical at the strategic level for the leading Arab states to assign it the highest priority. Consequently, they have not been sufficiently motivated to cooperate and share resources in order to achieve a nuclear option.

An Israeli decision to adopt a nuclear doctrine and completely erode the ambiguity surrounding her nuclear capability would undoubtedly serve as a powerful stimulus to Arab efforts to obtain a military nuclear capability.

It might be assumed, first, that the allocation of financial resources to nuclear development within Arab defense budgets could be expanded, thus easing the purchase of nuclear technologies. Second, in such circumstances, nuclear suppliers such as France and other European states, China, India, Pakistan, and perhaps even Russia would likely display a greater readiness to transfer nuclear technology, or even nuclear weapons. Third, an Israeli nuclear doctrine may have a negative influence on the overall international effort for non- proliferation, and may adversely affect US willingness to act against suppliers of nuclear technology and materials to Arab states or even to other states within the third world.

It is very easy for Arabs to cooperate and share resources to achieve a nuclear option. In addition, many of Arab states are able to build a nuclear program. Iraq, for example, has a nuclear policy dictated by both the Iranian threat and by Israeli nuclear developments, so it invested very considerably in the nuclear effort.

After the wide spread of regional and international reactions sparked by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Arab states, especially Egypt, should strive to secure their independence and negotiate issues that affect their national security. Arab and Egyptian efforts should be combined to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the Middle East region.

Previous Stories:
  Israel's nuclear dilemma and program   (7/3/1998)
  Israeli Mossad owns spying bases in Ethiopia and Eritrea on Yemen   (6/29/1998)
  Meguid calls on world community to force Israel to join nuclear non-proliferation treaty   (6/23/1998)

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