Israel's nuclear dilemma and program
Regional-Israel, Military, 7/3/1998

After Indian - Pakistani nuclear tests elicited wide reactions in the international community, it is useful to bring to the attention of our readers the book "Israel's Nuclear Dilemma," as it has relevance to the Arab states.

In this1994 book Yair Evron, a professor of international relations and head of a graduate program in Security Studies at Tel Aviv University, examines the problems and dilemmas caused by Israel's assumed possession of nuclear weapons and the wider consequences of this assumption on Arab - Israeli relations.

This study presents an account of the development of Israel's nuclear doctrine and the disagreements between the top Israeli decision-makers over whether an overt nuclear posture should be adopted.

The book contends that Israel's nuclear posture has hardly -- with the exception of Iraq -- influenced Arab military decisions as far as their relations with Israel have been concerned, and he argues that a system of nuclear deterrence along the lines of the old cold war model would be inappropriate for the Middle East. The author also concludes with an analysis of the major powers' anti proliferation policies and the possibilities for nuclear arms control in the region.

In the chapter addressing the nuclear status of the Middle East countries the author focused on the political-strategic context surrounding the development of Israeli nuclear technology, the main policy alternatives as proposed by key decision-makers, and the difficulties and doctrinal problems attendant on the various policy proposals.

Finally, against the background of repeated claims by international experts attributing to Israel a concealed nuclear capability, an attempt will be made to define three characteristics of the Israeli posture of ambiguity.

The catalyst for the Israeli nuclear research program, which was initiated in1948 soon after independence, was the discovery of a uranium deposit in phosphates in the Negev. The subject gained special importance with the Israeli decision to send a number of young physicists on study programs in nuclear research centers around the world. So, the Israeli government established the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, on June 13,1952, within the Ministry of Defense.

This commission became the main supervisory body for all activities associated with nuclear development. The commission's mandate was limited to consolatory and supervisory functions.

Development activities accelerated in the early 1950s, and centers for nuclear research were established at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Weizmann Institute.

The author states that these steps were the first in the formation of a nuclear program.

One consequence of the Israeli educational effort was the emergence of close ties between Israeli scientists and French nuclear research institutes, creating a conducive context for the nuclear agreement signed with France in 1957.

The extensive support given by France enabled Israel to initiate construction of the reactor in 1958. In that period, large-scale French support was granted to the Israeli nuclear project until the mid-1960's.

Then, the United States began to intervene in the late 1960's. The US sought to pressure Israel into allowing American scientists to check the reactor and its operations. Israel objected and it was not until a meeting between Ben-Gurion and Kennedy in May 1961, that a compromise was reached, in which Israel agreed to allow a one-time inspection of the reactor by two US scientists.

After that, the nuclear issue was a main focus of dispute among Israeli decision-makers. Ben-Gurion was the main advocate of this agreement, and had become a firm supporter of Israel's development of nuclear capability, apparently out of a pessimistic appraisal of future changes in the Israeli - Arab balance of power.

Ben-Gurion's decision to undertake the Sinai campaign was derived to a large extent from his fears of Arab unification under Nasser's leadership, and deterioration in the regional balance. He was convinced it was necessary, however, to develop a more permanent standing because that conventional advantage would not be long-standing, leading Ben Gurion to the nuclear solution.

From the beginning, the author said, Israeli leaders across the political spectrum tended to maintain a skeptical stance toward the proposal for adoption of an explicit nuclear doctrine, preferring an ambiguous posture.

Then the author tried to spell out the interests Israel has gained from adopting this policy, saying that while officially maintaining an ambiguous posture, the Israeli government continued developing its capability. According to various French reports, from the beginning the Dimona nuclear reactor had a far greater capability than the initial 24-megawatt size announced by Israel and other sources. In addition, the Israeli - French agreement also called for the construction of a plutonium-processing plant -- a unit that was not completed before 1996.

Israel also purchased, Yair added, natural uranium from various sources, primarily in Africa.

Some have estimated that Israel may have about 100 nuclear warheads. Basing this assessment on Mordechai Vanunu's account, Barnaby's study, and Pean and Peron's accounts, with suggestions that Israel may have been able to assemble "boosted" nuclear weapons, fission bombs with enhanced destructive capability.

Previous Stories:
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