Albright: time to seize the moment
Palestine-USA, Politics, 5/13/1998

Following is the complete text of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's speech:

Good afternoon, I am pleased to be here.

Two weeks ago, before departing for Asia and talks in London on the Middle East, I attended a dinner sponsored by the Seeds of Peace. This is a group that brings young people together from all around the Middle East to learn about and from each other to go beyond the stereotypes and to understand how much they have in common.

At that dinner, I was given a letter signed by Arab and Israeli youngsters which I hand-delivered in London to Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. I want to begin my remarks today by quoting from that letter.

"In our history books, the Middle East has always appeared as (a)... magnificent crossroads. Yet... we have not tasted its grandness, for we are blinded by its destructive wars...

We at Seeds of Peace had a taste of what it is like to coexist peacefully. We learned to accept the fact that both sides, Arabs and Israelis, have a right to a home in this disputed holy land... We are writing this letter as people who have experienced peace temporarily and we enjoyed the taste, but we want the whole pie. However, this is up to you. It is up to you to shape or build our future."

I would have liked very, very much to have been able to return to the United States this past weekend with the news that the prayers of those young people had been answered and that a new milestone in the Middle East peace process had been reached.

It was our hope that this week would have marked the start of permanent status negotiations between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat, hosted by the President of the United States.

Unfortunately, despite exhaustive -- and exhausting -- efforts to remove them, there remain obstacles to an agreement that would allow those permanent status talks to begin.

However, I look forward to meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu here in Washington tomorrow to see if it is possible to clear the way.

Today, I want to do two things. First, on behalf of President Clinton, I want to reaffirm America's commitment to the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace and our determination to continue exploring every possible avenue for helping the parties to achieve it. We do this because it is in our interests, and because it is right. The peoples of the Middle East deserve a future free from terror and violence; a future in which they can prosper in security and peace.

Second, I wanted to explain the logic of our approach and provide some perspective about what we have been doing in recent months to overcome the impasse that has developed in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

The past year has been the most disappointing since the Oslo accords were signed in 1993. It was 16 months ago that active U.S. mediation helped to produce an agreement on Hebron. Since then, a crisis of confidence has arisen between Israelis and Palestinians that has stalled progress at the bargaining table, and put at risk both historic accomplishments and future hopes.

In only two years, we've gone from a situation where Israel had some form of peace negotiation, relationship or promising contact with every Arab state except Iraq and Libya to a stalemate which has eroded regional cooperation on issues such as water, economic integration, the environment and refugees; stalled Arab-Israeli contacts; and caused optimism to be replaced by a sense of fatalism and helplessness about the future.

At the root of the stalemate is a crisis of partnership between Israelis and Palestinians wherein short term tactical considerations have too often trumped broader understandings of common interest and cooperation.

Indeed, we have gone from a situation where no problem was too big to solve to a situation where every issue is argued about. We have seen tragic incidents of terror, unilateral actions and provocative rhetoric undermine the historic accomplishments of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

For more than a year now, the United States has been working hard to revive the missing spirit of partnership. We have been trying literally to restore the ability of the parties to talk constructively with each other, to overcome mistrust, to solve problems, to arrive at agreements and to implement obligations.

Early last year, we were approached by Prime Minister Netanyahu with an idea for reorienting the process. He argued that the confidence-building period provided for under the Oslo Accords had begun instead to destroy confidence -- and he was right.

The Prime Minister argued that it therefore made sense to move directly into final status negotiations and to do so on an accelerated timetable. He asked President Clinton to help achieve this purpose. And as Israel's ally and friend, the President decided to try to do so.

Beginning last spring, and throughout the summer of 1997, we sought an agreement that would put the process back on track by focusing the parties on the importance of getting to permanent status talks. In August, I proposed in a speech here in Washington that the parties "marry the incremental approach of the interim agreement... to an accelerated approach to permanent status."

Then, last September, the Israelis and Palestinians agreed on a four part agenda that included accelerated permanent status talks and three other issues: security with the emphasis on preempting and fighting terror, the further redeployment of Israeli troops, and a time-out on unhelpful unilateral steps. There followed several months of intensive discussions on that agenda, along with resumed negotiations on key interim issues.

During this period, there was some narrowing in the differences between the parties, but very substantial gaps remained. Despite our efforts, we could not get the Israelis and Palestinians to agree to an accord.

Both urged us, nevertheless, to persist and to help them find a way to bridge their differences. By early this year we had come to the conclusion that even if the parties could not be responsive to each other's ideas, they might respond to ours.

Working closely and quietly with both sides, we began to share our views on how the parties might resolve their differences over the four part agenda.

In January, here in Washington, President Clinton met with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat. I met with them when I traveled to the region in February and then again in Europe in March. Ambassador Ross and Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have been in almost constant contact. Throughout, we continued to urge the parties to sort out the issues directly with each other.

Unfortunately, none of these discussions produced sufficient results. It was clear that tough decisions were required if Israelis and Palestinians were to reach an agreement, and that neither side was prepared to make them.

Having worked since January to share our thoughts informally with the parties at the highest level, it was logical that we should at some point share a more fully integrated set of ideas in an effort to facilitate decisions. We took this step not because we wanted to, but because there seemed no other way to break the dangerous logjam that had developed.

Our ideas stemmed from intensive consultations with both sides and take into account both the obligations each side has accepted and the vital interests each must protect. They are balanced, flexible, practical and reasonable.

They are based on the principle of reciprocity, another concept stressed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and embraced by us because of our belief that parallel implementation of each side's obligations is the only way to restore the partnership between Israelis and Palestinians.

In presenting our ideas, we made it clear that we were offering them as suggestions, not as an ultimatum or an effort to impose a settlement. Both parties have their own decisionmaking processes and interests, which we respect. Our purpose was only, in response to the parties' request, to help them find the way forward.

The role of the mediator is never an easy one. The challenge is how to meet the needs of both sides in a way that is acceptable to the other. And logically, that presents both sides with the need to be flexible and to make decisions that reflect the concerns not just of one party, but of two.

In this regard, our ideas were designed to find that balance and to persuade each side that the balance could be struck in a way that addressed their particular requirements.

Now, let me try to explain our approach as it relates to addressing Israel's requirements, foremost of which is security.

Let me say at the outset that there should be no doubt about the commitment of the Clinton Administration or of America to Israeli security. That commitment is unshakable and has been demonstrated over and over again, not only in words but in actions; in our joint struggle against terrorism; in the assistance to Israel that the American people have so long and so generously provided; and in the steps we have taken to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge.

These include providing Israel with the F-15-I, the most advanced fighter aircraft in the American arsenal; the prepositioning of American military stocks and material in Israel for possible joint use; and jointly-funded research and development projects designed to enhance Israel's ability to protect itself against long range missiles and Katyusha rockets.

And let me add that our commitment to Israel's security does not come with a time limit. There is no expiration date. It will continue today, tomorrow and for as long as the sun shall rise. I said that in Israel last year and I meant it. And that's true whether there is progress in the Middle East peace process or not -- or whether we have differences with Israel at a particular moment or not.

At the same time, we have agreed with Israeli leaders from Prime Ministers Ben Gurion to Begin and from Rabin to Netanyahu that the key to long term security for the Israeli people lies in lasting peace.

That is why we have been working so hard to resolve the present impasse. In so doing, we would not for a minute assert for ourselves the right to determine Israel's security needs. That is -- and must remain -- an Israeli prerogative.

Moreover, both in our ideas and in the way we presented them, we took fully into account Israeli concerns both about process and substance.

For example, we have given the parties many weeks to consider our ideas in private; we did not launch a public campaign on their behalf. And in response primarily to Israeli requests, we allowed more time and then more time and then more time for our suggestions to be studied, considered and discussed.

Moreover, the ideas we presented posed some very difficult choices for the Palestinians. They were required to make substantial changes in their negotiating position. Nevertheless, Chairman Arafat agreed to our ideas in principle.

The real centerpiece of our efforts to address Israeli requirements focused on dealing with Israel's fundamental and legitimate security concerns.

It was no coincidence that security was the first point on our four point agenda. Creating the right environment for negotiations had as its focus the issue of ensuring that Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was functioning at 100% and that Palestinians were exerting 100% effort to take effective unilateral steps against terror. That's why our ideas on security create a structure to ensure that the fight against terror will not be episodic, but that it endures.

From the beginning, we have made the security issue the center of our dialogue with the Palestinians. We have pressed them to understand that the fight against terror is a basic Palestinian interest.

And what we have seen, especially over the past several months, is a concerted Palestinian effort -- even in the absence of an agreement with Israel on the four part agenda -- against those who would threaten peace with terror and violence. The Palestinian Authority deserves credit for taking on such groups, but it is essential as they do, that others in the region who tell us they support peace refrain from greeting with cordial hospitality and financial backing the enemies of peace.

Our suggestions for Israeli redeployments were also formulated with Israel's prerogatives and concerns in mind. We recognize, as reflected in the Christopher letter, that further redeployment is an Israeli responsibility under Oslo, rather than an issue to be negotiated. But it is in the nature of partnership that Israel should take Palestinian concerns into account, while following the terms of its agreement. Otherwise, the peace process cannot move forward.

In presenting our ideas, we did not define the areas from which Israel should redeploy. Our ideas placed a premium on Israel retaining overall security responsibility in the areas affected by the proposed redeployment. And our suggestion about the size of the next redeployment came down far closer to Israel's position than to that of the Palestinians.

Why did we suggest a size? Because that is the only way to reach the agreement on launching permanent status talks that Prime Minister Netanyahu asked us to achieve.

In presenting and discussing our ideas, we have acted with discretion and patience. Because we realize the difficulty of the decisions the parties were being asked to make, we have gone the extra mile -- in fact, the extra 20,000 miles back and forth across the Atlantic many times. And we have done so without complaint, because America will always go the extra mile for peace.

I want to mention at this point also that America's commitment to peace and security in the Middle East has historically been a bipartisan commitment, stretching from the administrations of Truman and Eisenhower to Bush and Clinton.

Because that commitment involves the security of a cherished ally, and the vital strategic interests of the United States, our leaders have historically stood together -- in support of Israel and shoulder to shoulder with our Arab friends in pursuit of peace. If America is to play its proper role in promoting stability in the Middle East, it is imperative that our leaders now -- in the Executive Branch, in Congress, and within the Jewish-American and Arab-American communities -- continue to work together on behalf of shared goals.

Tomorrow, I will meet with Prime Minister Netanyahu again. I very much look forward to that meeting. We are working hard to overcome differences and I hope we will be able to make progress.

But the key point that I have been emphasizing to both Israeli and Palestinian leaders is that although America remains committed to the pursuit of peace, it is up to them -- not to us -- whether peace is achieved.

Over the past months, we have played the role of mediator, counselor, friend, shuttler, cajoler and idea-maker. We have responded whenever called at literally any time of the day or night. We have done this because we care about Israel and its people; we care about the Palestinians and Arabs; and we care about the future peace and stability of the region.

We are not giving any ultimatums; we are not threatening any country's security; we are not trying to make any party suffer at the expense of another -- all we are trying to do is find the path to peace, as the parties have repeatedly urged us to do.

And what we have especially been trying to do in recent weeks is to issue a wake-up call. The leaders of the region have reached a crossroads. Act before it is too late. Decide before the peace process collapses. And understand that in a neighborhood as tough as the Middle East, there is no security from hard choices, and no lasting security without hard choices.

The parties must understand, as well, that there is urgency to this task. For time is no longer an ally of this process; it has become an adversary.

The historic accomplishments that flowed from the Oslo process represented a strategic opportunity for peace that is now being put at risk.

Consider that just two years ago, at Sharm al-Sheikh, representatives from Israel and a host of Arab states gathered at the Summit of the Peacemakers to say no to terror and yes to peace. They saw Israel as a partner. Unfortunately, that exhilarating sense of partnership has been lost.

Second, the very idea that negotiations can peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict is now under threat. Unless the leaders are willing to make hard choices, the field will be left to extremists who have no interest in peace.

Third, the clock continues to tick. The interim period under Oslo concludes on May 4, 1999 -- less than a year from now. Those who believe that drifting is acceptable, or who believe they can declare unilateral positions or take unilateral acts when the interim period ends, are courting disaster.

Both sides must understand that the issues reserved for permanent status discussions -- including the status of the West Bank and Gaza and of settlements -- can only be settled by negotiation. That was the spirit and logic of Oslo.

America's interest -- and goal -- is a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace based on UN security council resolutions 242 and 338, including the principle of land for peace. That will require decisive progress on all tracks, including the Israel-Lebanon track, and the Israel-Syria track.

We are not a party to the negotiations. As president Clinton has repeatedly emphasized, it is not our right, nor our intention, nor is it within our capacity, to dictate the terms or impose a settlement.

At the same time, our credibility and interests are indeed affected by what the Israelis, Palestinians and Arabs do or fail to do. We are prepared to support their efforts as long as we judge they are serious about wanting to reach an agreement; and serious enough to make the decisions necessary to achieve it.

For too long, too many children in too many parts of the Middle East have grown up amidst violence, deprivation and fear.

Too many lives have been cut short by the terrorist's bomb, the enemy's shell and the assassin's bullet.

Too many opportunities have been lost to heal old wounds, narrow differences and transform destructive conflict into constructive cooperation.

Everyone with a stake in the Middle East has an obligation to do what can be done to seize the strategic opportunity for peace that now exists and thereby to make possible a future of stability and prosperity for all the people of the region.

The United States believes this kind of future is within our grasp. But the peoples of the region will not realize that future if their leaders do not reach out, with a vision as great as the goal, to overcome past grievances, treat neighbors as partners, and undertake in good faith the hard work of cooperation and peace. All that is required is for each to accord dignity and accept responsibility; and to act not out of passion and fear, but out of reason and hope.

For the peoples of the region, who have suffered too long, the path out of the wilderness is uphill, but clearly marked. The time has come now, before the dusk obscures the guideposts, to move up that road -- and by so doing, to answer the too-long denied prayers of the children -- all the children -- of the Middle East.

Thank you very much.

Previous Stories:
  Israeli Prime Minister to visit Washington tomorrow   (5/12/1998)
  Palestine urged to continue beyond latest failure of US efforts   (5/11/1998)

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