Mossad revelations on its agent with the false information on Syria
Israel-Syria, Politics, 12/8/1997

Israel finally disclosed the identity of the Mossad agent who had fed his superiors false information on Syria as Yehuda Gil, a retired agent whose services were sought by the Mossad over the past few years through a special contract. His superiors claimed his performance was outstanding and noted they had to call him back to service after his alleged Syrian agent had refused to cooperate with any other Mossad figure.

It was after the two television channels in Israel disclosed the identity of the agent that a magistrate court judge in Tel Aviv agreed to release some of the information pertaining to the case but ordered that Gil's picture not be published, for state security.

The damage caused by the false information, analysts in Israel said, was kept to a minimum since the information he passed was cross checked by many other branches of the Israeli intelligence and was found to contradict other assessments.

But so far, at least one person seemed to have won in this affair. That is the present head of the Mossad, Dani Yatom, whose name and career were damaged in the ill-fated Mossad attempt on the life of Hamas political figure Khaled Mishal in Amman.

Many Mossad officials did not hesitate to utilize the affair to enhance the credibility of Yatom, whose days in the Mossad had apparently were being counted in light of the Mishal affair. But now, with the full backing the prime minister given to Yatom and the press reports that spoke of Yatom's earnest decision to start the investigation into the false information affairs, Yatom seems to have fortified his position and is likely to escape any further repercussions from the Amman fiasco.

Yehuda Gil, 63, started his career in the Mossad as a minor agent responsible for handling other agents, known as sources, who gave information to the Mossad. Gil's father was an officer in the Italian army who continued to serve under the Fascist regime. In the R30s, after the forging of ties with Nazi Germany, the Italian army chief of staff tried to defend Jewish officers and thus sent them to far-off parts of the empire. That is how Gil's father found himself in Libya, which was then under Italian control. Yehuda was born in Libya and had shown talent for acquiring languages learning Arabic and Italian and later learning other languages as though they were his mother tongue.

Upon arriving in Israel, young and active, Yehuda's versatility with languages made him an easy recruit by the army intelligence. The same talents which impressed his superiors in the army led to his recruitment by the Mossad.

Despite his professional accomplishments and the great esteem in which he was held, Yehuda became bitter toward his employers. He believed the Mossad leadership did not sufficiently appreciate his talents. His ambition to be included in the Mossad command was not fulfilled. He retired from the Mossad and began to work for the ultra right wing Moledet party, which advocates the transfer of all Arabs out of mandatory Palestine.

Upon uncovering the false information affair, One Mossad veteran commented saying that if the Mishal Affair was an earthquake for the organization, this affair is a disaster. "This is the worst affair in the Mossad¹s history," he said.

Yehuda Gil is married a second time and is the father of three, one of whom is serving as an officer in an elite army unit. In the Mossad he is often characterized as an official who made a good impression on his surrounding colleagues, but also as a bit of a lone wolf, who was not good at supervising others. This is the main reason why, according to sources in the Mossad, he advanced very slowly on the professional promotion scale. Despite his strenuous efforts, his advance was too slow for his liking. Many years of service went by before Yehuda Gil received a senior position in the Mossad. Then many more years went by before he received a promotion above this senior spot.

In recent years, Gil continued to relay interesting information, seemingly from his source, but, as it turned out, he concocted this data in his own brain. This material was interesting despite the fact, or perhaps because of the fact, that it involved a clear-cut contradiction of what was known from other sources. Sometimes his information was questioned for its contents but for years nobody within the Mossad or outside of it suspected that Gil was fabricating the information, inventing false information which mostly attested to Syria¹s alleged aggressive intentions.

Only in the last three years did eyebrows start to rise in the intelligence community about something not being right. Other bodies, especially the military intelligence corps, demanded that the Mossad clarify what was going on. But the Mossad did not make haste to act. Suspicions started to circulate. In August 1996, when Syria¹s 14th division started to move on the slopes of the Mount Hermon, Gil came with information from his source, even though it was later found to be entirely concocted.

The information Gil conveyed to his superiors could have entangled Israel in an unnecessary war with Syria; fortunately, however, the data was not taken in complete seriousness because it contradicted information obtained from good sources and attested to the opposite scenario.

Investigators looking into the Gil affair have not sorted out conclusively the motives which compelled him to act as he did. Did his extreme right-wing views cause him to fabricate information which might have, had it been treated with utmost seriousness, led to a war? Did Gil intend to rattle the security system and cause it to understand the dangers it faces from the north? Was there a financial motivation? Did Gil keep in his own pocket the considerable funds he was allocated in order to pay off his sources? Or maybe the deviation was caused by some personality disorder? No answers have been reached as yet but one thing is clear: the Mossad has run through another crisis and its image, many believe, is beyond any repair, at least for the near future.

Gil, who was responsible for disseminating false information, served as one of the permanent instructors in a professional course at the Mossad¹s college. He spoke in a number of courses for officers in both the Mossad and the Shin Bet, Israel's domestic security agency. One of his courses, ironically enough, was under the title: RThe Lie As Art.¹ The course dealt with ways of lying in order to attain goals.

Gil was an experienced lecturer and routinely used stories and examples to illustrate successes and failures. The course was a very successful one and was considered to be one of the most attractive ones on the training course for agents. Generations of Mossad and Shin Bet agents took the course.

It was no accident that Gil was chosen to give the course. The Mossad considered him to be a master at attaining information by using false identities and ruses. ³The man of a thousand faces,² one of his former colleagues called him. ³A man who could show up in an apartment for the first time in his life and convince the owner of the place that all the property there really belonged to him.²

Previous Stories:
  Mossad agent with false information on Syria might face trial for high treason   (12/5/1997)
  How the Mossad almost started a war between Syria and Israel   (12/4/1997)
  Israel releases 22 Palestinian prisoners   (10/27/1997)

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