How the Mossad almost started a war between Syria and Israel
Regional, Military, 12/4/1997

A war could have broken out between Syria and Israel last summer because elements within the Israeli Mossad were behind false information and assessments that had been relayed to the Israeli government claiming that Syria had intentions to launch a surprise attack on Israel, it was learned Thursday.

In the same period, assessment branch officers in the military intelligence had concluded the contrary and insisted that Syrian army moves in the Golan Heights were more of a defensive than an offensive nature.

Both Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai and his chief of staff, Amnon Shahak, decided to side with their intelligence assessment and contrary to guidelines from the prime minister's office, they both decided to take a chance and not mobilize additional reserve forces, a move that could have led the region to an open war between Syria and Israel. They both relied on calming messages relayed from Damascus through the US, that Syria has no intentions to attack Israel.

The story regarding false information which influenced defense and political establishment assessments of the situation vis-a-vis Syria in the past few years was broken by prominent military analyst Ze'ev Schiff in Haaretz Wednesday. As a result of the false information, actions of strategic and political significance were taken, which were based upon incorrect assessments of the situation. The political and defense establishments have been aware of the false information for the past few weeks, and are now carrying out investigations of how this information affected the decision making process, particularly in 1993 when negotiations with Syria were broken off by Rabin and in the summer of last year when Syria moved its fourth division up to the Golan Heights close to the ceasefire lines.

Foreign Minister David Levy was the only official source to confirm that the false information affair was under investigation. ³Generally and hypothetically,² Levy told Israel Channel One Wednesday night, ³even if intelligence, position papers and assessments are the basis of statesmanship, woe to us had we relied only on that. One also has to use logic and examine everything carefully.² Left wing opposition Meretz party leader Yossi Sarid who is a member of the Knesset sub-committee on secret services, confirmed that the committee had received a few weeks ago a detailed report on the affair and commented that, "This is a very serious and embarrassing issue which undoubtedly had caused damage to Israel."

At the time of the presentation of this false information, the Mossad head was Shabtai Shavit, who had been in this post between 1989 and 1996. A few months ago, Shavit came out openly amid the heated discussion of Israel's ill-fated assassination attempt of Hamas's Khaled Mishal in Jordan and praised the operation and defended the current head, Dani Yatom, in the face of the harsh media criticism that he sustained. The head of the assessment branch in the Mossad at the time was Uzi Arad, currently political advisor to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and there is a feeling that Arad, for one reason or another, wanted to supply the top political echelon in Israel with means and pretexts to suspend peace talks with Syria. His assessment was strongly supported by Shavit.

Right after he quit his post in the Mossad last year, Shavit was asked by reporters if he shared the assessment of the military intelligence that Syria's goal was to reach a comprehensive peace in the region and his answer was: "No. Clearly not at all." The military intelligence branch in Israel has been advocating the assessment that since the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Syria had opted for peace as a strategic goal. Then head of the military intelligence, Major General Uri Saguy had reiterated this assessment in many forums, closed and open alike.

Two bodies have over the past weeks been busy investigating the issue with the aim of finding out if the former Labor government under Yitzhak Rabin was ready to pull back almost to lines of 4 June 1967 as a result of this assessment that warned war was imminent. The defense and political establishment in Israel are now concentrating on a backward investigation, in an effort to determine the time when the false information began to come in. The two critical periods are July to August 1993, when Rabin decided to abandon the Syrian track and go for the peace process with the Palestinians, and the months of September to October 1996, when the high tension along the Israeli-Syrian border nearly led to a confrontation.

There were various interpretations of the Syrian troop movement from Lebanon to Mt. Hermon last year and the Israeli leadership was split over the question of whether the Syrians had offensive or defensive intentions. The Syrian troop movement was carried out in a surprise move at the end of July last year, a month and a half after Netanyahu came to power, and more than six months after peace talks between Syria and Israel in Washington were halted. As part of the troop movements, Syria moved thousands of soldiers and armored vehicles, including tanks, to the Hermon area.

Syria at the time had insisted that its troops movement was in response to large maneuvers the Israeli army held in the Golan Heights and Syrian President Hafez Assad was clear in his statement when he said he was committed to counting on the peace process. But it was a statement attributed to Syrian chief of staff Hikmat Shehabi in July which had caused deep concern in Israel. Shehabi said that the military option against Israel was possible should the peace efforts lead to nowhere.²

Previous Stories:
  Rabin was willing to return Golan   (8/29/1997)
  Israeli ambassador to US warns: Syria preparing for war   (8/14/1997)
  Netanyahu's policies, warns of war... Syrian army chief says   (8/4/1997)

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