US: Iran has stopped nuclear weapons development
Iran-UN, Politics, 12/11/2007

The National Intelligence Council has made public the summary of a report on Iran's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. The report released early this month states that Iran had stopped work on design for nuclear weapons since 2003.

Although the report confirms what Iran had been saying in that its program is civilian and not military, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad-Ali Hosseini on Sunday termed some parts of the recent US report on Iran's nuclear program as "incorrect". He said, "What is mentioned in the report on Iran's nuclear activities before 2003 is incorrect, wrong and unreal." Iran said that unlike what was claimed by the 16 US intelligence bodies, Iran has never pursued a program to develop nuclear weapons and the reports released by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have confirmed that the country has had no deviation from its peaceful nuclear activities, Hosseini reiterated.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said, "In that report it has been said that they (the Americans) have obtained the information through espionage satellite and espionage activities." He said the day when the report was published, Foreign Ministry voiced its protest in a note to the Swiss Embassy, asking it to provide Iran with explanations about the espionage. "There are both facts and lies in the report of the Americans."

White House Spokesperson Dana Perino today said that Secretary Gates' comment on Saturday night, in which, he said that if Iran is now saying that our intelligence report is correct, "it might mark the first time in history that Iran has said that's true. And if that is the case, then do they also agree that they are enriching uranium for a possible nuclear weapon in the future? Are they also testing these ballistic missiles, which would be a delivery system for a future nuclear weapon? It's a very opaque society in Iran. The President asked for more information from our intelligence community. He got more information, and it confirmed what he thought to be true, which is that Iran was a threat, is a threat, and will certainly continue to be a threat if we don't stop them from obtaining the capability to have a nuclear weapon."

The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) has served as a bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for Intelligence Community collaboration. The NIC's key goal is to provide policy makers with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information—regardless of whether analytic judgments
conform to US policy.

Key Judgments are stated as follows:
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence
that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium
enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously
undeclared nuclear work.

• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.

• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of
intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt
to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.)

• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons
program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop
nuclear weapons.

• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently
have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined
to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure
suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged
previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least
some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired
from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would
need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge
with high confidence it has not yet done.

C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough
fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge

enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons
program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating
them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be
technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.

• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of
producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the
possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.

D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could
be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high
confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development
projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would
also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.

E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing
to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its
options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt
it to restart the program.

• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to
international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit
approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and
military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified
international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its
security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived
by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear
weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.

• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo
the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s
key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable
effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment,
only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would
plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.

F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities—
rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium
conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been
restarted through at least mid-2007.

G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing
and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.

H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial
capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.

Previous Stories:
  Pressure on nuclear agency chief against Iran by 'bad-tempered' countries   (11/14/2007)
  Iran urges stronger ties with Iraq, withdrawal of US   (11/14/2007)
  Iran welcomes any plan securing enrichment rights   (11/6/2007)
  Iranian minister on US threats   (11/6/2007)
  Ahmadi-Nejad: Iran not interested in talks with USA, rejects it unilateral sanctions   (10/30/2007)
  Mottaki: Iran nuclear rights not to be trampled upon   (10/23/2007)
  CIA: No weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq   (10/3/2003)
  CIA officials deny Iraq's involvement in terrorist acts   (2/7/2002)

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