UN report on Hariri murder, part 2, full text
Lebanon-Syria, Politics, 3/16/2006

An intermediate report by the UN investigation committee into the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri said:

Here follows is the full text of an intermediate report by the UN investigation committee into the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, part 2 (part 1 can be read in the link of the bottom of the page):

56. Hamadeh case: At around O9O5hrs, on Friday 1 October 2004, a car exploded when Minister Marwane Hamadeh was driving on California Street, in the locality of Dar El Mraisseh, Beirut. The explosion caused the immediate death of his security escort. Marwane Hamadeh and his driver sustained serious injuries.

57. New-Jdeidh case: At around OO3Ohrs, on Sunday 19 March 2005, an explosion took place at the locality of New-Jdeidh, a residential area North of Beirut. The bomb was placed close to a pillar of a building near a parked car. As a result of the blast, eleven persons were injured, 38 cars were damaged and the building sustained significant damage.

58. Kaslik case: At around OO45hrs, on Wednesday 23 March 2005, an explosion took place in "Altavista" tower, a commercial centre, in Kaslik, North of Beirut. The area is known to be very crowded during the day but quiet, except for guards, at night. The blast caused the death of one guard and two of his friends and seven persons were slightly injured. The blast caused significant material damage.

59. Bouchria case: At 2125hrs, on Sunday 26 March 2005, an explosion took place at the locality of Sid-El-Bouchria, an industrial area with only carpentry and mechanics enterprises in the Northeast of Beirut. The location of the explosion is about one kilometer distance from the location of the bomb explosion that occurred on 19 March 2005 (New-Jdeidh case). The bomb was placed behind a car and near a concrete pillar. The blast caused serious material damage to cars and buildings. A number of persons were wounded, sustaining minor injuries.

60. Broumana case: At around 2145hrs, on Friday 1 April 2005, an explosion took place in a commercial mall called "Plaza centre" in Broumana, East of Beirut. The bomb was placed close to a concrete pillar located near the door of the parking area. At this hour the commercial centre was closed. The blast damaged many shops and offices; nine persons were slightly injured.

61. Jounieh case: At around 2lOOhrs, on Friday 6 May 2005, an explosion took place at Central Street in Jounieh, near the building of the "Voice of Charity" radio station. The bomb was placed close to a concrete pillar of the building where the radio station offices are located. At this hour offices and shops were closed. After the blast, the radio stopped broadcasting for a few days. The blast caused destruction of at least two buildings. Several other buildings and cars were seriously damaged and eleven persons injured.

62. Samir Kassir case: At around 1045 hrs, on Friday 2 June 2005, an explosion took place in a small lane in Ashrafieh district, Beirut. The blast targeted the car of Samir Kassir, a prominent journalist. The car had been parked the night before, at around midnight, in front of Mr. Kassir's residence. The bomb exploded when Mr. Kassir sat down on the driver seat. He died as a result of the blast.

63. George Hawi case: At around O95Ohrs, on Tuesday 21 June 2005, an explosion took place near a gas station on Boustany Street in the locality of Wata Msaytbeh, in Beirut. The explosive charge targeted the car of George Hawi, a former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party. The car had been parked on the night of 20 June 2005. On 21 June 2005, Mr. Hawi left his house and sat in the front seat beside the driver. It was known that Mr. Hawi left his house at almost the same time everyday. The driver started the engine, drove off, and after several hundred meters the explosion occurred, killing Mr. Hawi and slightly injuring his driver.

64. Elias El-Murr case: At around 0945hrs, on Tuesday 12 July 2005, the former Minister of Interior, and current Minister of Defence, Elias El-Murr, left his house using his car to go to his office in Beirut. He was accompanied by two other persons and drove the car himself. In the Naccache area, they passed a parked car which exploded at around lOl8hrs. A person who happened to pass by in his car was killed. Mr. El-Murr and his two companions were seriously injured in the explosion, which also caused serious material damage.

65. Ashrafieh-Monot street case: At around 2145hrs, on Friday 22 July 2005, an explosion took place in the Ashrafieh-Monot area in Beirut. The site of the explosion is an open road leading to Monot Street. The bomb was placed near an abandoned house, between a wall and a car. The blast slightly injured 13 persons and caused damage to cars which were parked on both sides of the road.

66.Zalka case: At around 2200hrs, on Monday 22 August 2005, an explosion took place in an auxiliary road at Zalka, a commercial area located North of Beirut. The bomb was placed on the roof of a garage. The blast slightly injured eleven persons, partially damaged some cars.

67. Ashrafieh-Naoum Libki Street case: At around 2345hrs, on Friday 16 September 2005, an explosion took place in Naoum Libki Street in Ashrafieh, Beirut. The street only has residential buildings. The explosion caused the death of one person, slightly injured ten persons and caused serious material damage.

68. May Chidiac case: At around 1 74Ohrs, on Sunday 25 September 2005, in the Ghadir area, a bomb seriously wounded Ms. May Chidiac, a prominent journalist, as she had just entered the car. The car was parked in front of a friend's house and the bomb was placed under the driver's seat.

69. Gebran Tueni case: At around O95Ohrs, on Monday 12 December 2005, in the Mkalles area, an explosion took place causing the death of Gebran Tueni, his driver, and a security escort. Mr. Tueni, a Member of Parliament and head of the An-Nahar newspaper, had just returned the previous day from Paris, France. Mr. Tueni left Lebanon after the assassination of Mr. Hariri to reside in France because of threats against his life.

C. Initial comparative review of the 14 other cases

70. An initial comparative review of the available information appears to reveal certain characteristics common to the 14 crimes. For example, the Commission notes that three of these terrorist acts were perpetrated against politicians, using vehicle bombs, three others targeted two journalists and a politician, using booby-trapped vehicles and eight bomb explosions seemingly targeted the urban infrastructure.

The car bomb cases

71. In these cases, which occurred on Friday 1 October 2004, Tuesday 12 July 2005 and Monday 12 December 2005, respectively, the perpetrators targeted three well known politicians, Marwane Hamadeh, Elias El-Murr, and Gebran Tueni. The first is a Druze Muslim while the other two are Christian Orthodox. Mr. Hamadeh is presently the Minister of Communications in Lebanon. Mr. El-Murr is the son-in-law of President Emile Lahoud and currently the Minister of Defense. Mr. Tueni was the nephew of Mr. Hamadeh and a well known journalist heading An-Nahar Newspaper. Mr. Tueni ran as a candidate in the last elections and won a seat as Member of Parliament.

72. The car bombs used in these three cases were placed in a Mercedes E300, a Mitsubishi Montero Sport, and a Renault Rapid. It is alleged that in the blast targeting Mr. Hamadeh's car, 10kg of TNT was placed between the back seat and the trunk and directed towards the outside; in the other two cases, 40kg of TNT was used as a charge. In all three cases, the detonation was probably triggered by a remote control device. In the case of Mr. Hamadeh, the car bomb was parked at the right side of the road and right in front of a road bump. In the case of Mr. El-Murr, his car was struck by a car bomb that was placed in a vehicle at the right-hand side of an up-hill road. In the case of Mr. Tueni, the car bomb was parked in an ascending curved road.

Following the assassination of Mr. Tueni, a Muslim fundamentalist group, called The fighters for the unity and freedom of Bilad El-Cham, sent a fax to a newspaper based in London, claiming responsibility for the assassination of both Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir.

The booby-trapped car cases

73. These three blasts took place on Friday 2 June, Tuesday 21 June, and Sunday 25 September 2005 targeting prominent media figures and a politician in Lebanon, Samir Kassir, Georges Hawi and May Chidiac. The first two were Christian Orthodox, while the third is a Christian Maronite. All three were well known for their criticism against the Syrian presence in Lebanon and had intensified their criticism following the assassination of Rafik Hariri in their articles, TV shows and public statements in general.

74. In each case, the location where their cars were parked at the time of the explosion was unguarded. Mr. Kassir and Mr. Hawi parked their cars, around midnight, the night before the blasts. Ms Chidiac parked her car in front of a friend's house. Mr. Kassir and Mr. Hawi died immediately as a result of the blasts, while Ms. Chidiac, protected by the strong frame of her vehicle, survived the explosion but was seriously injured.

75. In the cases of Ms. Chidiac and Mr. Hawi, the bombs were attached to their cars, while in the case of Mr. Kassir, it is still unclear whether the bomb was attached to the car or placed on the ground underneath the car. It is unclear whether Mr. Kassir and Ms. Chidiac had started their cars before the blast, while Mr. Hawi had already traveled several hundred meters, sitting in the passenger seat. In all three cases, the bombs were located underneath the seat of the targeted persons. It is possible that the perpetrators wanted to harm only the targeted person and not necessarily other passengers in the cars.

The bomb explosion cases

76. Eight bombs exploded between 19 March 2005 and 16 September 2005. Four of these blasts took place on Fridays 1 April, 6 May, 22 July and 16 September 2005. A hypothesis being examined is that the pattern of these blasts, taking into consideration the time of the blast and the choice of the location, could indicate that the perpetrators did not have the intention of carrying out targeted assassinations. Rather, they appear to have intended to damage the infrastructure or spread fear among the public.

77. The neighborhoods where the blasts occurred are commercial and/or residential and considered to be areas inhabited by Orthodox and Maronite Christians. Ashrafieh, where two blasts occurred, is perceived as a Christian neighborhood. Five explosions took place between 2lOOhrs and 2200hrs: in Bouchria, Jounieh, Zalka, Broumana and on Monot street in Ashrafieh. Some of the locations are known to be crowded during the day but quiet at night and only attended to by guards. The remaining three blasts occurred after 2200hrs: in Naoum Libki street, Ashrafieh (at 2345hrs), in New-Jdeidh (at OO3Ohrs) and in Kaslik (at OO45hrs), all three in residential areas. The blasts injured persons and caused significant and serious damage to the surrounding buildings and vehicles. In two blasts, in the Kaslik case and the Ashrafieh-Naoum Libki Street case, it appears from the records of the Lebanese investigations that a total of four persons have died.

78. In these cases, the bomb was placed near locations such as a concrete pillar, an auxiliary road that was quiet and empty, a garage roof, or an abandoned house. The charges used for the blasts varied between 8kg and 35kg. In four cases the charge was 25kg. Most of the bombs were put in plastic bags, except for one case, where the bomb was put in a black rucksack or backpack. In all the cases the forensic experts stated that the detonation was triggered either by remote control or a timed device.

79. At this stage, taking into account the qualitative level of the investigations conducted in all 14 cases and of the evidence currently available, it is too early to conclude or even make an assumption that any of the 14 other cases are linked either with each other or with the Hariri case. However, the Commission remains actively engaged in evaluating any information emanating from each of these 14 cases against the backdrop of this hypothesis.

D. Findings emanating from the provision of technical assistance

80. Following is a list of the Commission's main observations during its interactions with the Lebanese judicial and law enforcement institutions. The findings have been discussed with the investigating judges and should be addressed expeditiously by providing the necessary capacity, training, and further technical assistance to support the Lebanese investigations into the 14 terrorist acts.

81. All Lebanese judges agree with the finding that the crime scenes were interfered with in the immediate aftermath of the blast/s, although not necessarily maliciously. In several cases, when the investigating judges arrived at the crime scene they found a crowd of people on the scene. This demonstrates that while several security agencies were usually present at the crime scene, an effective securing of the scene did not occur. Thus, coordination between the different security services needs to be improved; clear lead responsibilities need to be defined for such basic but critical activities, as failure impacts negatively on the ability to conduct effective investigations at the crime scene.

82. It is also likely that the intervention of firefighters and other first-responders, a situational necessity, has made forensic collection of residual explosives and other material evidence more complicated. This is particularly true given the lack of in-depth forensic expertise in Lebanon, most notably in the area of forensic crime scene management and procedure, and of adequate technical resources for specialized units, which currently have only basic equipment, supplies and tools.

83. Coordination between the investigating judges of the 14 cases is not seamless, especially as they have numerous other cases to investigate. This is compounded by their occasional difficulties in gaining access to information and intelligence products. The Commission has thus suggested to the Lebanese authorities that investigating judges with specific expertise or experience in terrorism investigations be assigned to these cases.

84. The Security services use investigative techniques with no analytical capacity and electronic tools, and lack technical administrative resources such as computers and photocopy machines.

85. As a result, the lack of progress made to date in the investigations of the 14 other terrorist acts committed since 1 October 2004, appears, in the Commission's opinion, to strain the confidence in, and trust between, the judiciary, the various security forces, the families of victims, and the public in general.

Next steps

86. Individual discussions have taken place with each investigating judge and with the office of the Prosecutor General concerning a number of areas that would benefit from future technical assistance and a greater development of capacity to enable investigations to be undertaken more effectively. These measures are currently subject to further discussions between the Commission and the Lebanese authorities.

87. The Commission continues to extend technical assistance in the form of forensic and crime analysis capacity for each individual case, and provides its expertise by conducting comparative analysis with the Hariri investigation.

88. While it is not within the mandate of the Commission to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the functioning of the Lebanese judicial and law enforcement agencies, the Commission continues to interact closely with all relevant institutions to provide advice and guidance, as asked and as appropriate, and within the overall mandate and capacity of the Commission.

IV. International Cooperation

89. All States are required to fully cooperate with the Commission. Security Council resolution 1595 (2005) unequivocally "calls on all States and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission." This obligation is reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 1636 (2005) and resolution 1644 (2005) which call "upon all States to extend to the Lebanese authorities and to the Commission the assistance they may need and request in connection with the inquiry, and in particular to provide them with all relevant information they may possess pertaining to this terrorist attack." Cooperation of all member States, as and when appropriate, is of critical importance to the Commission as the successful completion of its work depends on it. During the reporting period, the Commission has thus continued to request assistance from member States, on both judicial and technical matters.

A. Cooperation with Syria

90. Security Council resolution 1595 (2005) and resolutions 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), both adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, require Syria to fully cooperate with the Commission. Based on this framework, the Commission has pursued its efforts to obtain full and unconditional cooperation from Syria, both on legal and operational matters.

91. In its previous reports, the Commission highlighted several instances of difficulty encountered when seeking cooperation from the Syrian authorities. In order to address the real and urgent need to make progress on this issue, in the interest of expediting the investigation, the Commissioner twice met with senior Syrian officials to discuss the practical modalities of their cooperation. On 23 February 2006, the Commissioner met with the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry, and the Chairman of the Syrian Special Judicial Commission (SSJC), in Damascus. On 7 March 2006, the Commissioner met again with the Deputy Foreign Minister and the Legal Adviser, this time in Beirut. As a result, the Commission has now reached a common understanding with Syria of the legal framework for their cooperation and of certain practical modalities to facilitate the expeditious implementation of the Commission's requests for assistance. The understanding will be tested in the upcoming months.

1. Framework of cooperation

Legal framework

92. It was understood that the legal framework for the Commission's operations and activities is principally formed by the body of relevant Security Council resolutions, most notably resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), and the recognized standards of international criminal law, taking into account national law where consistent with such standards. Thus, there is no need for a separate cooperation agreement between the Commission and Syria. The Commission applies its own procedures, consistent with generally recognized standards of criminal procedure. As far as executing investigative measures within the jurisdiction of Syria, the Commission will, as appropriate, take into account Syrian law and judicial procedures.

Access to information and sites in Syria

93. According to resolution 1595 (2005) and 1636 (2005), Syria should grant the Commission full access to documentary, testimonial and physical information and evidence it possesses that the Commission deems relevant to the inquiry. The resolutions further require Syria to grant the Commission full access to sites and facilities on Syrian territory. Syria has signaled its intention to fully comply with these resolutions. The Commission intends, as appropriate, to request full, unhindered and direct access to documents, facilities and sites, in the presence of Commission officials.

Location and modalities for witness interviews

94. Resolution 1636 (2005) also vests authority in the Commission to determine the "modalities of interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the inquiry." The Commission takes a practical and pragmatic approach with regard to the modalities and logistical aspects of interviews of Syrian citizens. It will therefore determine the location of interviews on a case-by-case basis, taking into account security and other concerns.

Interview of senior officials and the Head of State

95. Emphasizing the relevant provisions of resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), and 1644 (2005), the Commission reaffirmed its right to interview any Syrian officials. The Syrian authorities have confirmed that members of government should be available for such interviews by the Commission. Moreover, following the two meetings between the Commission and Syrian government officials, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Commissioner on 9 March 2006 that a meeting with the President and another meeting with the Vice-President will take place during the upcoming month.

Procedures for arrest of Syrian nationals

96. As stipulated in resolution 1636 (2005), should the Commission request the arrest of a Syrian official or individual suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organizing or perpetrating of the criminal acts at issue, the relevant Syrian authorities would be obliged to make that person "fully available to the Commission." Syria has signaled that it will fully comply with any such requests, including by arresting and making available to the Commission the person concerned, taking into account, as appropriate, Syrian legal procedures.

Communication with the Syrian authorities

97. There were differences of view in the past between the Commission and the Syrian authorities with regard to the role of the SSJC. While the Commission encourages the SSJC to effectively discharge its functions and collect information relevant to the inquiry, it is understood that the appropriate official interlocutor of the Commission remains the Government of Syria, represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Evaluation of information provided in response to Commission requests

98. The Syrian Government has, through the SSJC, in particular in the last three months, formally complied with nearly all of the Commission's previous requests for assistance. It has provided responses on a number of specific issues that were raised with the authorities, some of which had been pending since November 2005. For instance, on 22 February 2006, the SSJC informed the Commission that it had examined the archives of the Military Intelligence and reviewed records related to the political situation in Lebanon, as requested by the Commission. A number of reports concerning the security and political situation in Lebanon were handed over to the Commission. These and other documents provided to the Commission are currently being reviewed for their relevance to the investigation.

99. Despite these encouraging steps, it is important to note that the Commission will ultimately judge cooperation of the Syrian authorities on the merits of the information provided and the promptness with which its requests are being accommodated. The Commission is currently in the process of preparing additional requests for assistance related to Syria's presence in Lebanon and specific requests related to the assassination of Mr. Hariri. In order to ensure implementation of such requests, the Commission and Syrian authorities will hold regular working level meetings on cooperation matters.

B. Cooperation with other governments and entities

100. The Commission has continued to request, through embassies in Beirut and permanent missions to the United Nations in New York, further judicial and technical assistance from member states. In response, judicial and expert technical assistance was provided by several governments. The Commission welcomes, in particular, the valuable technical and judicial assistance it has received during the reporting period from France, the Netherlands, Japan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). French authorities provided valuable logistical assistance during the interview of a witness residing on French territory and are expected to facilitate additional witness and suspect interviews. Dutch forensic experts have assisted the Commission in providing technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in one of the 14 other cases. The commission has received substantial cooperation from the Japanese and the UAE authorities in connection with the investigation into the theft of the Mitsubishi Canter truck, of which engine parts were found at the crime scene of the Hariri assassination.

101. The Commission is also grateful for the assistance received from international judicial and law enforcement organizations such as the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, and law enforcement agencies such as Interpol. They have made available human resources assistance and qualified staff to assist the Commission in its work. As the investigation progresses further, this assistance will be increasingly crucial to the Commission. The Commission would, therefore, welcome additional assistance from individual governments and the above-mentioned institutions by making qualified and specialized human resources available.

102. In its earlier reports, the Commission had already highlighted the critical need for member states to make available to the Commission specific information of immediate relevance to the investigation. This remains an area to be pursued with relevant member states. At this stage, the Commission would welcome any information that would advance the investigation, whether it is directly linked to the crime or in support of the broader requirements relating to this complex case. In conformity with the well-established practice of international judicial or law enforcement institutions, any such information provided on a confidential basis would not be disclosed and would be used for internal investigative purposes only.

V. Organizational Support

103. The imperatives of resolution 1644 (2005) to extend the Commission's mandate initially until 15 June 2006 and to expand it to incorporate the provision of technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities (in relation to the 14 cases that occurred since I October 2004), and bearing in mind the possible establishment of a tribunal of an international character, presented a considerable challenge to the Commission in the early weeks of this reporting period.

It was a priority for the incoming Commissioner to consolidate the Commission's financial, institutional, and managerial structure. Retaining and gradually strengthening its key investigative capacity and providing continuity in the leadership and substance of the investigations were the cornerstones of the Commission's organizational efforts during this transitional period.

104. In particular, the staffing situation encountered, most notably in the critical area of investigations, crime analysis, and forensics, was difficult in terms of lack of resources. The uncertainties surrounding the actual length of the Commission's mandate had led to the gradual departure of significant numbers of key staff, primarily investigators, since September 2005. By the end of 2005, such downsizing of the Commission's staffing level had reduced the number of investigators/analysts to nine from previously 48 budgeted posts, and by February 2006, the number was six. The Commission was forced to focus much of its initial attention on rebuilding a team based around the dedicated and professional capacity remaining without loss of momentum or direction for the investigation.

105. In this context, the Commissioner commends the exemplary dedication of the Commission's staff, particularly those still present since the very beginning of the investigation, in a highly volatile and constrained work/living environment. The Commissioner is paying particular attention to maintaining staff morale to sustain the high levels of commitment and professionalism currently displayed.

106. The Commission reviewed its entire staffing table, developed a new budget and appropriate job descriptions, and recruited a number of new multi-disciplined staff members, including by approaching international judicial and law enforcement institutions and member states. All staff members presently employed are equipped with skills, qualifications and experience in complex investigations, counter-terrorism investigations, or international criminal law enforcement/ justice initiatives, that are commensurate with the requirements of the expanded mandate. The Commission will need to continue to dedicate part of its efforts to the recruitment of qualified and professional staff in order to ensure sustainability of the investigation beyond the expiration of its current mandate and towards a possible tribunal of an international character.

107. In particular, the Commission enhanced its investigative capacity by adding two critical components to its existing structure: a legal advisory unit and an integrated support services component. These components are being staffed with specialists in the field of international investigations, international and comparative law, criminal analysis and other functional specialized areas of relevance. Both components will help to ensure that technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities continues to be provided comprehensively and with maximum professionalism. It will also enable the Commission to carry out "over the horizon" planning, as and when appropriate, to prepare for the transition of the investigation from the Commission to a possible tribunal of an international character, or any other court of law.

108. The legal component provides legal advice on matters of international and Lebanese law and matters of cooperation with member states. It will ensure internal legal consistency in the Commission's day-to-day work. It will also provide legal support to the operational activities of the investigation component. The integrated support services component will provide operational support to the various aspects of the Commission's on-going investigative work. It will establish systems to improve the Commission's information management capability, forensics expertise and witness protection capacity, and ensure that all of the above operate at the highest levels of professional standards and methodology.

109. To support the large influx of information that has already been collected and is anticipated to further grow over the next three months, it is necessary to procure and manage electronic systems that ensure efficient data management. Adequate electronic analysis tools are fundamental to the progress of the investigation. In particular, the procurement of appropriate case management software will be crucial in portraying the legal construction of a case, ensuring relevant evidence is associated to individual legal elements and evidence thresholds are met for each case component.

110. Alongside the introduction of standard procedures for interviewing witnesses and suspects, sensitive source management and interpretation/ translation management, and in order to ensure that case management capability is efficient and meets minimum legal standards, the following measures are being implemented to ensure the expanded and extended mandate can be fulfilled and remains sustainable: a single unified hard-copy filing system; a single unified electronic-copy filing and data retrieval system; a datestamping receipt, storage and distribution system for incoming information; security protocols for electronic and hardcopy information storage; an external requests for assistance management and tracking system; a single unified protocol for liaison with Lebanese authorities; and a management system for authorization of missions and travel.

VI. Conclusions

111. With the expansion of its mandate and the prospect of a tribunal of international character on the horizon, the work of the Commission has entered into a new phase. It continues to extend its assistance to Lebanese authorities, building upon the work done in 2005 and is putting maximum investigative effort into the case of the killing of Rafik Hariri and 22 others. A significant number of new lines of inquiry, identified since January 2006, have already enabled faster-than-expected progress in two important areas. Along with the on-going development and refinement of case knowledge, the Commission is confident that its support to the Lebanese authorities will result in a successful outcome to the investigations within a realistic time-frame.

112. The Commission has begun the provision of further technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities for their investigations into 14 other alleged terrorist attacks since 1 October 2004. This aspect of its work is eliciting potentially significant areas of investigative development in linking these cases (or some thereof) together. The Commission is of the view that it is necessanecessary to make short, medium and long term investments into the capacity of the relevant Lebanese judicial and law enforcement agencies in specific areas of expertise.

113. Interaction with the Lebanese authorities is close and frequent. The Commission will strive not only to maintain this excellent working relationship, but will continuously seek to find ways to further assist and enhance the interaction and information exchange. It must be noted that the Commission's capacity and mandate to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities is limited. It can only provide preliminary assistance from its organic capacity, can identify future capacity requirements for the Lebanese authorities and enter into dialogue with states and other entities in pursuit of the fulfillment of those measures identified.

114. The Commission has laid the groundwork with the Syrian authorities for improved cooperation based on the framework set out by the relevant Security Council resolutions. It looks forward to receiving timely and relevant responses to its requests, as agreed by the Syrian government.

115. The Commission has enjoyed good support from the United Nations system at all relevant levels. In light of the continuing staffing requirements due to the highly specialized levels of expertise required in many aspects of the Commission's work, human resources management will have to remain a priority focus for this interaction. Effective human resources management underpins the sustainability of the Commission's capability to perform its tasks and ensures it has the capacity to cope with future transitional requirements without deflecting from its core work objectives.

116. The Commission is fully aware of the limitations that its conservative approach to sharing case relevant information publicly and providing details on the pursuit of particular lines of inquiry may pose to the Council. The Commission would like to take this opportunity to assure Council members that this cautious approach is an integral part of its overall investigation strategy, and indeed, is standard investigation practice.

##6- Syria Condemns Israeli Attack on Jericho Prison

Syria on Wednesday strongly condemned Israels breaking into the West Banks prison of Jericho and the kidnapping of several Palestinian figures who were detained inside, adding that the parties who withdrew their joint guards were to blame for the incident.

A Syrian Foreign Ministry official source said Syria considered Israels act as amounting to ugliest form of state terrorism. The source called for the release of Ahmad Saadat, General Shubaki and all other kidnapped prisoners.

While asserting support to the legitimate struggle led by the Palestinian people to restore their rights, Syria calls on all the Palestinians to close the ranks in the face of this flagrant aggression, the source added.

Previous Stories:
  UN report on Hariri murder, part 1 full text   (3/16/2006)
  Lebanese consensus on Damascus, dismantling Palestinian weapons   (3/15/2006)

Please add a link on your webiste pointing to ArabicNews.com and bookmark ArabicNews.com & subscribe to our daily email news bulletin.

Search