UN report on Hariri murder, part 1 full text
Syria-Lebanon-UN, Politics, 3/16/2006

An intermediate report by the UN investigation committee into the assassination of Former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri said "The Commission has moved closer to establishing a unifying theory of the exact circumstances of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri, 21 other named victims and a single unidentified person, possibly one of the perpetrators. It has evaluated comprehensive supporting evidence, including forensic findings of how the crime was perpetrated and on the nature of the blasts. It has also further examined the possibility of an aboveground, underground or combination impact. Engaging the services of terrorism experts was of great help to the Commission and has produced valuable new insights into the means and methods used by the perpetrators on the day of the crime."

Here follows is the full text of the report in two parts:

Third report of the IIIC established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595, 1636 and 1644

The Security Council requested the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission to report to the Council on the progress of the inquiry, including on the cooperation received from the Syrian authorities, every three months from the adoption of resolution 1644 (2005) 0115 December 2005.

This third report details the status and progress of the investigation into the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others, and highlights the progress made in consolidating the Commission's organizational structure and resources in light of both its expanded and extended mandate.

The consolidation provides critical continuity to the core work of the Commission following the appointment of the new Commissioner, and allows it to afford necessary technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities with regard to the investigation of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, as requested by the Council in resolution 1644 (2005).

In the critical area of cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic, a common understanding has been reached on the operational modalities in such areas as the applicable legal framework, access to individuals, sites, and information, and communications with the Government.

The report presents a number of conclusions in regard to the investigation of the Hariri assassination, and the capacity of the Lebanese authorities to conduct their investigations into presently 14 other cases of assassination attempts, assassinations, and explosions perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004.

Contents

I. Introduction 1-12

II. Progress in the Investigation 13-48

III. Technical Assistance in 14 other

cases 50-88

IV. International Cooperation 89-102

V. Organizational Support 103-110

VI. Conclusions 111-116

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1644 (2005) of 15 December 2005, in which the Council requested the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission ("the Commission") to report to the Council on the progress of the inquiry every three months, including on the cooperation received from the authorities of the Syrian Arab Republic ("Syria").

It covers the progress made in implementing the Commission's mandate as laid out in Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), and 1644 (2005) since its last report of 10 December 2005 (Sf20051775).

2.This third report details the status and progress of the investigation into the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others ("the Hariri investigation"), and highlights the progress made in consolidating the Commission's organizational structure and resources in light of both its expanded and extended mandate. The consolidation provides critical continuity to the core work of the Commission, and allows it to afford necessary technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities with regard to the investigation of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, as requested by the Council in resolution 1644 (2005).

3.The Commission's work has entered into a new phase, commensurate with the natural progression of any criminal investigation. It is developing a deeper understanding of the structural and political environment in which the crimes took place, an enhanced capacity to pursue new lines of inquiry, and a methodological approach to ascertain the reliability of information obtained, corroborate new evidence and findings, and, where appropriate, review initial leads and working assumptions.

4.In this phase, it remains critical for the success of the Commission's work to ensure the application of recognized standards of international and Lebanese law. The Commission is conscious of the fact that only a credible investigative process will be able to assist and guide the Lebanese authorities in their own investigations, and provide an accepted basis for the establishment of a tribunal, possibly of an international character, as requested by the Prime Minister of Lebanon in his letter to the Secretary General of 13 December 2005 (S/2005/783), and reflected in resolution 1644 (2005). In anticipation of the latter, the Commission has enhanced the identification, planning, implementation and management of various support systems commensurate with cases of this complex nature.

5.While conscious of the high level of expectations surrounding its work, the Commission is encouraged by the Lebanese authorities' recognition of the need for a systematic and methodological approach to the investigation. This includes the application of internationally accepted investigative and legal standards and an awareness of the timescale realities required to pursue the investigations successfully, as already concluded by the Commission in its previous reports.

6.The investigation of the blast that killed former Prime Minister Hariri and 22 other victims has advanced further. Based on a systematic evaluation of available but previously not tracked forensic evidence, the Commission has moved closer to establishing the exact circumstances and modus operandi of the blast.

This will provide a critical link in the chain of evidence needed to identify and hold accountable those who are perpetrators, sponsors, organizers, and accomplices of the crime.

The Commission, however, does not deem it appropriate, at this stage, to disclose further details of its work as this may unnecessarily threaten the security of witnesses, compromise the collection of future evidence and undermine the outcome of the investigation as a whole.

The Prosecutor General of Lebanon agrees with this approach.

7.The Commission has continued to share, on a regular basis, information and results of the Commission's investigative efforts with the relevant Lebanese authorities and has broadened its dialogue with law enforcement and judicial authorities to identify areas in which the Commission can best assist the Lebanese efforts.

8.Moreover, since receiving authorization by the Council in resolution 1644 (2005), the Commission has directed part of its capacity to the task of extending technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities with regard to the investigations of the assassination attempts, assassinations, and explosions perpetrated in Lebanon since I October 2004.

This has involved the provision of legal, forensic, and analytical expertise and cooperation to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of presently 14 cases.

9.International cooperation remains key to successfully discharging the Commission's mandate. To that end, progress has been made in the critical area of cooperation with Syria.

In view of the difficulties encountered by the Commission in the past in accommodating its requests for cooperation, the Commission held two high-level meetings, in Damascus and in Beirut, with senior Syrian Government officials.

A common understanding has been reached on the operational modalities in such areas as access to individuals, sites, and information, witness/suspect interviews, the applicable legal framework, and communications with the Government. This understanding will be tested in the upcoming months.

10.In this context, the Commission has reaffirmed the legal framework of its operations and activities, which is principally formed by the body of relevant Security Council resolutions, most notably resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), and the recognized standards of international criminal law, taking into account Lebanese and other national law where consistent with these standards.

11.During the reporting period, the Commission was also required to direct considerable time and effort at the consolidation of its internal structure and capacity. Uncertainties surrounding the actual length of the Commission's mandate had led to the gradual departure of significant numbers of key staff primarily investigators, and posed a challenge to the incoming Commissioner's endeavors to ensure continuity and a seamless transition.

The Commission reviewed its entire staffing table, developed a new budget and appropriate job descriptions, and recruited a number of new staff members, in part by approaching international judicial/law enforcement institutions as well as member states.

12.All staff members presently employed are equipped with the skills, qualifications, and experience needed to conduct complex terrorism investigations and international criminal law enforcement activities. Reconciling the focus on staff security with the need to maintain staff morale and the high levels of commitment and professionalism in a volatile and restrictive environment continues to be a priority for the Commission's senior management.

II. Progress in the Investigation

A. Support mechanisms

13.During the reporting period, the Commission introduced a number of essential support mechanisms (see in more detail under Chapter V. of this report) to further strengthen the investigation process, including an operational analysis capacity; a legal advisory and analysis capacity; forensic coordination and analysis capacity; an information systems management capacity commensurate with the complexity of the case; standard operating procedures for investigative work such as interviews of witnesses and suspects; minimum legal and operational standards for interpreters and translators; the procurement of electronic analysis tools and case management software; specialist skills, e.g. anti-terrorism expertise, as and when required; and a rolling recruitment process to provide continuity and depth to the investigation effort. These core functions within the investigative process are crucial to conduct complex patterns analysis, manage extensive amounts of communications data, and identify linkages.

B. Methodology

14.In pursuing the investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 21 other named victims (Zahi Abou-Rjeyleh, Yehya Al-Arab, Mohammed Al-Ghalayini, Abdul Hamid Al-Ghalayini Mahmoud Saleh Al-Khalaf, Sobhi Al-Khodr, Omar Al-Masri, Mahmoud Hamad Al-Mohammad, Joseph Aoun, Alaa Asfour, Rima Bazzi, Abdu Bou-Farah, Mazen Dahabi, Yamama Damen, Mohammed Darweesh, Bassel Fouleyhan, Rawad Haydar, Farhan Issa, Talal Nasser, Haytham Ousman, Ziad Tarraf. An unidentified body was also found), the Commission, since the January of this year, has been following a three-pronged approach: (i) review of collected information and evidence; (ii) analysis of existing information and evidence; and (iii) pursuit of selected existing or identified new lines of inquiry. While shifting in their relative emphasis, all three core objectives are being advanced, simultaneously, to ensure balanced strategic direction and continued forward momentum.

15.Firstly, the Commission undertook a review of all intelligence, information and evidence collected since the inception of its work in June of 2005. The review has included an assessment of the manner and rationale for the collection of this large volume of material as well as an evaluation of the evidentiary standard and legal thresholds applied. All key collection categories (i.e. crime scene, execution of the assassination operation, linkages to alleged perpetrators, perpetrator involvement and target identification) have been subjected to this process. This review has been nearly completed.

16.Secondly, the Commission has established a multi-disciplinary investigative capacity to analyze and review existing and new intelligence, information, and evidence, in order to assess its value for the development of the case. Such capacity is essential to effective investigative work and to assess any modifications in the case direction.

17.Thirdly, the Commission continues to pursue selected existing lines and newly identified lines of inquiry while ensuring the application of minimum international operating and legal standards, at all times, in anticipation of a possible future judicial process.

18.Following the above-mentioned review of the existing sources, a decision has been taken to discontinue some of the previously identified leads, and to corroborate and ascertain the specific utility of some others to the case.

C. Current status of the investigation

1. Circumstances of the blast

Nature of the impact

19.The Commission has moved closer to establishing a unifying theory of the exact circumstances of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri, 21 other named victims and a single unidentified person, possibly one of the perpetrators. It has evaluated comprehensive supporting evidence, including forensic findings of how the crime was perpetrated and on the nature of the blasts. It has also further examined the possibility of an aboveground, underground or combination impact. Engaging the services of terrorism experts was of great help to the Commission and has produced valuable new insights into the means and methods used by the perpetrators on the day of the crime.

20.Since the beginning of the Commission's work, there have been numerous forensic reports, varying both in their terms of reference and the specificity of tasks undertaken. Over the last few weeks, all of these reports have been subjected to a comparative forensic analysis aimed at establishing areas of commonality or contradiction, gaps in their terms of reference, and the quality of forensic collection. This analysis was necessary to satisfy the minimum standards required of any future legal process as well as to enable the investigation to discard certain theories while testing and scrutinizing other theories.

21.As a result, further forensic study of the crime scene will be carried out, including the examination of surrounding areas, types and origin of the explosives conducting important DNA analysis as well as a thorough examination of the damaged vehicles.

22.Forensic examination of the crime scene It is likely that fragments from relevant vehicles are still at the crime scene. Thus, even after the crime scene is designated as "clean" of forensic evidence and handed over to the Lebanese authorities for re development, the Commission will continue to provide forensic coverage for the blast affected area, in case any other forensic-related evidence is found.

23.DNA examination The Commission deems it necessary to establish the ethnic and regional origin of the single unidentified person whose human remains have been found at the crime scene and to complete an inventory of DNA samples that have been collected and analyzed to date. Also, parts of the driving compartment of the Mitsubishi truck have been collected and will be tested for explosives residues, DNA and/or fingerprints. They will, thus, be submitted for forensic examination and comparative analysis.

24.Inventory of forensic exhibits A complete inventory of all forensic exhibits is being established to record essential data, including the type of exhibit, picture, date and origin of collection, identity of the examining person and actual location.

25.Exact time of blast/s The time of occurrence given by the report of the initial fact-finding commission (S/2005/203), namely 12:56:26, and by the National Centre of Geophysics in Lebanon, namely 12:55:05, differ. It is crucial to establish the reasons for a time difference of apparently 1 minute 21 seconds, then determine the exact time of the blast/s, in order to integrate other forms of evidence concerning the implementation and mechanical aspects of the operation.

26.Videotape analysis Further forensic and media-technical examination is required of the videotape of Ahmad Abu Addas and its packaging, e.g. DNA, fingerprints, videotape analysis.

27.Seismologic analysis While the seismologic analysis has been conducted by specialists in natural seismology, it is necessary to complement this with an analysis by specialists in artificial seismology to determine the properties of the explosion.

Properties of the blasts

28.While there still remains contradictory information on whether the blasts occurred underground or aboveground (as well as on the immediate events surrounding the attack), the Commission is pursuing promising lines of inquiry and achieving clarity in this respect. It has prioritized its evaluation of possible road works occurring in the vicinity of the explosion prior to the detonation.

Mitsubishi truck

29.In its second report the Commission discussed the line of inquiry surrounding a stolen Mitsubishi truck. This remains an on-going initiative, with significant DNA analysis being scheduled and further information being sought as to the vehicle's origins and movements prior to the blast/s. It was stated that further investigation was required into an allegation that a Mitsubishi truck was seen in a camp in Zabadane (Syria) shortly before the explosion This allegation needs to be further corroborated and remains an on going line of enquiry in the context of the evaluation of the information provider.

HSBC footage

30.The Commission noted in its previous report that certain individuals present at the crime scene and captured in the HSBC Close Circuit TV footage had been acting suspiciously and that further interviews would be required This line of enquiry remains open. Additional analysis of the HSBC footage is on-going to support new lines of inquiry, in particular concerning the modus operandi of the perpetrators.

Modus operandi for the attack

31.There still remains no single unifying theory with comprehensive supporting evidence of how the execution of the operation was implemented. However, the Commission is closer to a more complete understanding of how the preparatory work was undertaken, how those who participated on the day performed their respective tasks, what those tasks were before, during, and after the attack and of the overall modus operandi employed by the perpetrators for the attack.

32.Four investigative measures contribute to this understanding: (i) the collection of witness and victim testimony; (ii) forensic investigation; (iii) expertise in the means and methods assessments; and (iv) overlaid application of analysis of communications patterns, both on the day of and in the lead-up to the crime. The latter aspect is being evaluated for authenticity and reliability. While the Commission has obtained significant results in this area over the last two months, it would not be appropriate to disclose any specific information at this stage of the investigation.

33.On a more general note, it has become clear that the means and methods of such a terrorist operation are more complex in their preparatory and planning stage, and simpler in their execution. The individuals who perpetrated this crime appear to be very "professional" in their approach, as they planned to a high percentage likelihood for success, and conducted the operation with high standards of individual and collective self-discipline. It must be assumed that at least some of those involved were likely experienced in this type of terrorist activity.

Other previously identified leads

34.In its second report, the Commission suggested that further investigation into the mooted delay of Mr Hariri' s motorcade and into the apparent interference with telecommunications on 14 February 2005 would be undertaken, and that the origins of a call to Al-Jazeera be further investigated. The first two topics have been largely dealt with by the Commission, and it has satisfied itself as to the findings and their relevance. The third topic remains under consideration, and the Commission is actively engaged in clarifying and developing the issue.

2. Those who committed the crime on the ground

35.The identification of the actual "on the ground" perpetrators of the crime on the day is an on-going aspect of the investigation. The Commission believes it is inappropriate to comment extensively on this facet of its inquiry, but can state that it has made progress in the investigation and pro-actively continues to pursue its work into this component of the case.

3. Those who enabled the crime

36.The Commission believes that there is a layer of perpetrators between those who initially commissioned the crime and the actual perpetrators on the day of the crime, namely those who enabled the crime to occur. Participation in enabling the crime can be tangential or central to its perpetration, and can carry differing levels of criminal liability. Because this area of the investigation promises to be fruitful for the Commission, it is being given priority. While the Commission has identified a number of individuals for interviewing or re-interviewing, as well as other forms of evidence for review, no further details can be disclosed at this stage due to the critical requirement for confidentiality.

37.The Commission is also actively pursuing several lines of enquiry identified in its previous reports. For example, the role of the Al-Ahbash organization, and members thereof, is still being evaluated for its relevance to the investigation. Likewise, the Commission's earlier suggestion to restore military intelligence archives for its review remains an on-going line of investigative inquiry. The Commission also continues to investigate and evaluate the extent to which certain intercepted telephone conversations referred to previously provide any insight into the scope of involvement of key individuals in the assassination. Further, the reduction of security personnel for Mr. Hariri' is currently being evaluated in the context of its relevance and in relative terms of priority with other lines of inquiry. Similarly, the Commission is evaluating the documentation of orders by the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF) asking to place Mr. Hariri under surveillance.

4. Those who commissioned the crime

38.Due to the highly complex nature of the sponsoring, support and execution of terrorist activities, it is critical for the Commission to identify and utilize new forms of intelligence and information to establish links between the crime itself and those who enabled or commissioned it. The Commission is proactively pursuing a number of sources which can yield such data.

39.The Commission has also begun conducting a series of interviews aimed at clarifying the existence of an alleged informal oral agreement referred to in its previous report as the "Damascus Protocol."

40.Regarding other previously identified leads, the Commission has evaluated the relevance of issues surrounding the affairs of the bank Al-Madina and concluded that the issue remains a task for f investigation. The second report also mentioned that a fund operated by the former Director of Surete Generale was being cross-checked with other lines of inquiry' This remains the case today and continues to be a factor for investigative consideration as and when appropriate.

41.Moreover, the Commission has undertaken a comparative telephone analysis cross-referencing numbers allegedly related to the Hariri assassination and the 14 other attacks. This analysis has been completed as a preliminary exercise, and remains a priority task for further consideration. Similarly, the analysis with regard to a pre-paid SIM card user has been completed as a preliminary exercise and remains a priority topic for the investigation.

5. Interaction with the Lebanese

authorities

42.In its resolution 1595 (2005), the Security Council requested that the Commission assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the 14 February 2005 terrorist act. In order to enable the Commission to discharge its duties, the Council stated that the Commission shall enjoy the "full cooperation of the Lebanese authorities, including full access to all documentary, testimonial and physical information, and evidence in their possession." In addition, the Council gave the Commission the authority to "collect any additional information and evidence," in particular to interview witnesses. The framework set out by the Security Council has been further refined in a Memorandum of Understanding of 13 June 2005 between the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon.

43.The interaction between the Commission and the Lebanese authorities is the centerpiece of this novel joint - national and international - effort to identify the perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices of the terrorist attack of 14 February 2005. The Commission would like to commend the commitment displayed in this respect by the Prosecutor General of Lebanon and his office, and the investigating judge in this case. Close coordination and effective interaction will become even more essential as and when the investigation is nearing its completion and the results of both the Commission's work and the Lebanese investigation will be used in a court of law.

Information sharing and coordination

44.Numerous coordination meetings were held in recent months and case-related information has been shared, including witnesses and suspect statements. For instance, on 2 March 2006, the Commission received from the Lebanese authorities statements taken by 1SF investigators regarding an important aspect of the investigation. In turn, on 3 March 2006, the Commission transmitted to the competent investigating judge seven binders of documents, including witness/suspect statements. On 8 March 2006, the Commission's and the Lebanese authorities' forensic experts met to discuss the status of various DNA projects both related to the Hariri investigation and that of the 14 other terrorist attacks. Forensic coordination is critical to ensure that these 14 cases are being investigated adequately from a forensic perspective, both individually and horizontally.

45.These initiatives have already contributed towards strengthening the investigative capabilities and confidence of the Lebanese judicial and law enforcement agencies. It must be recalled that the Commission is primarily assisting the Lebanese authorities in their investigation. Hence, it must be ensured that all relevant information be shared with the Lebanese authorities in a timely fashion to enable the Lebanese judiciary to adequately discharge its functions. The Commission will thus, as a matter of policy, accompany any witness/suspect statements shared with the Lebanese authorities with its own assessment of the actual evidentiary value of the information provided.

46.Among the issues still to be clarified with the Lebanese authorities is that of information obtained from sensitive sources. Naturally, the Prosecutor General would like to have access to all information obtained from sensitive sources relevant to the ongoing investigation.

47.However, sensitive sources and potential witnesses who appear to possess credible information relevant to the investigation have on occasion conditioned their cooperation with the Commission upon the premise that their information will not be divulged to the Lebanese authorities. The Commission aims at finding a practical case-by-case solution to this issue that would allow for the testing of integrity and reliability of sources or potential witnesses. The ability of the Commission and the Lebanese authorities to keep and attract further potential insider witnesses will depend on the ability to protect them. A first meeting has taken place between the Prosecutor General's office and the Commission to begin discussions on the application of witness protection support programs within the context of the national Lebanese judicial system, and possibly a tribunal of an international character. The discussions covered the flail range of measures and procedures commonly associated with such programs.

Suspects and arrests

48.In the course of the ongoing investigation into the attack of 14 February 2005, and in order to preserve their procedural rights, several individuals have been interrogated as suspects by the Lebanese judiciary and the Commission In total 14 suspects were arrested by the Lebanese and, in one case by the French authorities, some following a recommendation by the Commission To date, 10 individuals are still held in custody in connection with the Hariri investigation.

49.All these individuals are suspected of having committed crimes under the Lebanese Penal Code, the Weapons and Ammunitions Law, and the so-called Law dated 11 January 1958. The suspects can be grouped into three categories: (i) persons suspected of instigating and participating in the planning and execution of the crime, based on articles 270, 271, 314, 549 and 549/201 of the Penal Code, articles 2,4, 5 and 6 of the Law dated 11 January 1958, and articles 72 and 76 of the Weapons and Ammunitions Law; (ii) individuals suspected of withholding information concerning a crime committed against state security, forgery, or fraudulent use of personal documents, based on articles 398, 471 and 471/454 of the Penal Code, articles 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Law dated 11 January 1958, and articles 72 and 76 of the Weapons and Ammunitions Law; and (iii) individuals suspected of making false testimony, based on article 408 of the Penal Code.

Ill. Technical Assistance in 14 Other Cases

50.In resolution 1644 (2005), the Security Council authorized the Commission, following the request of the Lebanese Government, to extend its technical assistance as appropriate to the Lebanese authorities with regard to their investigations of the terrorist attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004, that is, the assassination attempts and assassinations and explosions that took place in Lebanon starting with the attack on Minister and Member of the Lebanese Parliament Marwane Hamadeh on 1 October 2004. The Council also requested the Secretary General, in consultations with the Commission and the Lebanese Government, to present recommendations on whether to expand the mandate of the Commission to include investigations of those other attacks.

A. Progress in providing technical

assistance

51.The Commission has offered assistance in seven substantive areas: crime analysis; legal analysis; forensic analysis and investigation; identification of next investigative steps, gaps, and areas of strength; horizontal inter-case crime analysis; identification of any linkages of the 14 cases to the Hariri investigation; and identification of areas for future investigative capacity building measures. Mindful of the Commission's continuing operational focus on the Hariri investigation, the provision of such assistance takes place on a case-by-case basis and is governed significantly by the amount of resources available to the Commission for these tasks. More detailed technical assistance may become necessary should preliminary assessments indicate potential linkages between the 14 cases or with the Hariri investigation.

52.The Commission met with the Prosecutor General of Lebanon on 1 February 2006 to discuss the modalities of the requested technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities. Based on a series of additional individual meetings with the relevant military and investigating judges in charge of these cases, the Commission developed an action plan. On 6 February 2006, the Commissioner and the Prosecutor General, joined by the investigating judges, agreed on the modalities of their cooperation with respect to the investigation of those terrorist attacks perpetrated since 1 October 2004.

53.Between 8 and 24 February 2006, the Commission held 14 meetings with eight investigating judges responsible for the cases. The objective of the meetings was to understand the facts and merits of each individual case; to assess the status and progress of the investigation; to discuss any problems encountered during the investigations; and to hear the investigating judges' views on means to manage the investigative issues. Based on these meetings and additional documentation provided, the Commission conducted individual case analyses and established the respective requirements of each case in terms of technical assistance to be provided by the Commission.

54.In addition, the Commission visited the crime scenes of seven attacks for preliminary orientation and assessment purposes. It further held meetings on 24 February 2006 with the Chief of the Explosives Department of the Scientific Police Division of ISF and the Chief of the Explosives Ordinance Devices Unit (Engineer Battalion). A meeting was held with the Prosecutor General's office to discuss witness management and protection services, particularly in light of the possible creation of a tribunal of an international character. The Commissioner also had a working meeting with the management of the 1SF forensic laboratory to discuss the need for further support to establish adequate technical capabilities.

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