Army general says law violated at Iraqi prison
Iraq-USA, Politics, 9/10/2004

A key U.S. Army general who investigated abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq says prisoner abuse was not the result of military doctrine, and that abuse would not have occurred if doctrine had been followed and interrogation training had been conducted.

Despite his finding, General Paul Kern told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee September 9 that certain elements of the doctrine used for interrogation and detention operations need "to be updated, refined or expanded."

Kern, commanding general of the U.S. Army Materiel Command, said there is no single, simple reason why the abuse of Iraqi prisoners held in U.S. custody occurred. He attributed it to misconduct by a small group of American soldiers and civilians, lack of discipline by leaders and soldiers assigned to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, and a failure of leadership by multiple layers of Combined Joint Task Force-7, which was responsible for ground operations in Iraq.

In testimony submitted to the committee, Kern said the investigation found both "serious misconduct and a loss of moral values." The graphic photographs of alleged prisoner abuse that circulated through the media in 2004 "were not the result of any doctrine, training or policy, but violations of law," he said.

There were leaders who knew better "but did nothing," Kern said. There were also soldiers who acted improperly "because they were confused by their experiences and direction," he said.

For investigative purposes, Kern said abuse was defined "as treatment of detainees that violated U.S. criminal law or international law or treatment that was inhumane or coercive without lawful justification."

In addition, Kern testified that the interrogation practices carried out at the Abu Ghraib facility also led to a loss of accountability that contributed to "ghost detainees," or individuals who were never formerly logged into the prison system and for whom there was no proper accounting.

He said abuse attributed to military personnel has been referred for criminal or disciplinary action. The Justice Department is investigating allegations of abuse by civilian contractors.

Following are excerpts of Kern's remarks as prepared for delivery:

(begin excerpt)

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL PAUL KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

BEFORE THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON, IRAQ

SECOND SESSION, 108TH CONGRESS

SEPTEMBER 9TH, 2004

... Our report ... however, discusses the failure of a relatively small number of soldiers who served at Abu Ghraib prison. The teams conducted an investigation that focused on the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade (205th MI BDE) and its chain of command; however, we went where the facts led us. Our final report from this investigation is complete. In the course of this investigation, we discovered serious misconduct and a loss of moral values. We set our course to find truth, not to "whitewash" nor to convict those who are not incriminated. We found the pictures you have seen were not the result of any doctrine, training or policy, but violations of law.

We learned there were leaders in Abu Ghraib who knew about this misconduct -- knew better and did nothing. Some soldiers behaved improperly because they were confused by their experiences and direction. And we violated our own regulations by allowing "ghost detainees" in detention facilities.

All this was happening as thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, civilians and contractors fought bravely to restore an elected government in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are very proud of their service, commitment, courage and values. They and their families can stand tall and proud. I regret, however, that we must report on those who failed. ...

The events at Abu Ghraib cannot be understood in a vacuum. Three interrelated aspects of the operational environment played important roles in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. First, from the time V Corps transitioned to become Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), and throughout the period under investigation, it was not resourced adequately to accomplish the missions of the Combined Joint Task Force. Those missions were stability and support operations (SASO) and support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CJTF-7 headquarters lacked adequate personnel and equipment. In addition, the military police and military intelligence units at Abu Ghraib were severely under-resourced. Second, providing support to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) required greater resources than envisioned in operational plans. Third, operational clans envisioned that CJTF-7 would execute SASO and provide support to the CPA in a relatively non-hostile environment. In fact, opposition was robust and hostilities continued throughout the period under investigation. Therefore, CJTF-7 had to conduct tactical counterinsurgency operations, while also executing its planned missions. That is the operational context in which the abuses at Abu Ghraib took place.

Abuses

We found that abuses -- on the part of military intelligence and military police personnel -- clearly occurred at the prison at Abu Ghraib. For purposes of this report, abuse is defined as treatment of detainees that violated U.S. criminal law or international law or treatment that was inhumane or coercive without lawful justification. Whether the Soldier or contractor knew, at the time of the acts, that the conduct violated any law or standard, is not an element of the definition.

There is no single, simple explanation for why this abuse at Abu Ghraib happened. The primary causes are misconduct (ranging from inhumane to sadistic) by a relatively small group of soldiers and civilians, a lack of discipline on the cart of the leaders and soldiers of the 205th MI BDE and a failure or lack of leadership by multiple echelons within CJTF-7. Contributing factors can be traced to issues affecting command and control, doctrine, training, and the experience of the soldiers we asked to perform this vital mission.

The abuses at Abu Ghraib primarily fall into two categories: a) intentionally violent or sexual abuse and, b) abusive actions taken based on misinterpretations or confusion regarding law or policy.

LTG (Lieutenant General Anthony) Jones (lead Army investigator) found that while senior-level officers did not commit the abuses at Abu Ghraib, they did bear responsibility for lack of oversight of the facility, failing to respond in a timely manner to the indications and warnings provided by reports of incidents within the command and as reported by agencies such as reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross, and for issuing policy memos that failed to provide clear, consistent guidance for execution at the tactical level.

[Army] MG (Major General George) Fay found that from 25 July 2003 to 6 February 2004, 27 205th MI BDE Personnel allegedly requested, encouraged, condoned or solicited Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees and/or participated in detainee abuse and/or violated established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations during interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib.

Most, though not all, of the violent or sexual abuses occurred separately from scheduled interrogations and did not focus on persons held for intelligence purposes. No policy, directive or doctrine directly or indirectly caused violent or sexual abuse. In these cases, soldiers knew they were violating the approved techniques and procedures.

Confusion about what interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from the proliferation of guidance and information from other theaters of operation; individual interrogator experiences in other theaters; and, the failure to distinguish between interrogation operations in other theaters and Iraq. This confusion contributed to the occurrence of some of the nonviolent and nonsexual abuses but did not contribute to the abuse that you have seen in the photographs

Alleged incidents of abuse by military personnel have been referred to the CID (701st Military Police Group) for criminal investigation and the chain of command for disciplinary action. Alleged incidents of abuse by civilian contractors have been referred through the Department of Defense to the Department of Justice.

Discipline and Leadership

Military Intelligence and Military Police units had missions throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO); however, 205th MI Brigade and 800th Military Police Brigade leaders at Abu Ghraib failed to execute their assigned responsibilities. The leaders from units located at Abu Ghraib or with supervision over soldiers and units at Abu Ghraib, failed to supervise subordinates or provide direct oversight of this important mission. These leaders failed to properly discipline their soldiers. These leaders failed to learn from prior mistakes and failed to provide continued mission-specific training. The 205th MI Brigade commander did not assign a specific subordinate unit to be responsible for interrogations at Abu Ghraib and did not ensure that a Military Intelligence chain of command at Abu Ghraib was established. The absence of effective leadership was a factor in not sooner discovering and taking actions to prevent both the violent/sexual abuse incidents and the misinterpretation/confusion incidents.

Neither Department of Defense (DOD) nor Army doctrine caused any abuses. Abuses would not have occurred had doctrine been followed and mission training conducted. Nonetheless, certain facets of interrogation and detention operations doctrine need to be updated, refined or expanded, including, the concept, organization, and operations of a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC); guidance for interrogation techniques at both tactical and strategic levels; the roles, responsibilities and relationships between Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel at detention facilities; and, the establishment and organization of a joint Task Force structure and, in particular, its intelligence architecture.

Other Contributing Factors

Demands on the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities in a counterinsurgency and in the future joint operational environment will continue to tax tactical and strategic assets. The Army needs trained and experienced tactical HUMINT personnel.

Working alongside non-DOD organizations/agencies in detention facilities proved complex and demanding. The perception that non-DOD agencies had different roles regarding interrogation and detention operations was evident. Interrogation and detention policies and limits of authority should apply equally to all agencies in the Iraqi Theater of Operations.

"Ghost Detainees"

My investigation resulted in specific findings regarding the issue of "ghost detainees" within Abu Ghraib. It is clear that the interrogation practices of other government agencies led to a loss of accountability at Abu Ghraib. DOD must document and enforce adherence by other government agencies with established DOD practices and procedures while conducting detainee interrogation operations at DOD facilities. This matter requires further investigation and, in accordance with the provisions of AR 381-10, Part 15, is being referred to the DOD Inspector General, as the DOD liaison with other government agencies for appropriate investigation and evaluation.

Soldiers/sailors/airmen/marines should never be put in a position that potentially puts them at risk for non-compliance with the Geneva Convention or Laws of Land Warfare. ...

(end excerpt)

Previous Stories:
  US: No Policy of abuse at Abu Ghraib; direct responsibility up to the brigade level   (8/26/2004)
  Abu Ghraib Investigation: Army report faults some military intelligence personnel   (8/26/2004)
  Sit-in in Rabat to protest abuses against Iraqi prisoners   (5/15/2004)

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