Palestinians regain control over Jerusalem 'with consent of Israel'
Palestine-Israel, Politics, 1/10/2000

The Palestinian security services have lately obtained a free hand in Occupied Jerusalem in return for intelligence coordination with the Israeli secret services, an Israeli researcher concluded recently.

In a study released last week, The researcher, Dr. Menahem Klein argues that the Israeli General Security Services, GSS, have found it hard to accumulate intelligence information in the Palestinian controlled territories and has been forced to resort to aid of the Palestinian security forces. In return, the Palestinian security forces started to operate in East Jerusalem with the approval of the Israeli GSS and with its blessing, said Dr. Klein, an expert on Jerusalem in the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.

In recent years, a think tank in the institute has been working to formulate options for a solution to the issue of Jerusalem in the framework of the final status agreement between the Palestinian government and Israel. The study, entitled "Doves in the Skies of Jerusalem," reviews developments in the city between the years 1977-1999. Klein shows in his study that the Palestinians employ a tourist police force in East Jerusalem, whose job is to curb the pickpockets who work next to tourist sites in the Old City of East Jerusalem. The tourist police was established after the heads of the churches complained to the Jerusalem police of the phenomenon that hurt their business, since tourists began to avoid the Christian sites because of the pickpockets and thieves. When the Israeli police failed in handling their complaints, church heads appealed to Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, who gave his orders to the Palestinian Preventive Security headed by Colonel Jibril Rajoub, to act like a tourist police in the city of Jerusalem.

The study said that the permission granted by the Israeli security establishment to Jibril Rajoub and his men to operate in East Jerusalem aroused the anger of the Jerusalem police already back in 1994, as they viewed this as "a blow to Israel's sovereignty" in the city. Klein, in a chapter devoted to the subject entitled "PLO moves to strengthen the Palestinian identity of East Jerusalem," shows that former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin supported the police's position, but argues that in practice, Israel's ability to prevent Palestinian activity was weak.

However, relations between the two security forces have not always been as smooth as the study argues. Back in the beginning of 1996 until mid 97, Israel arrested 76 Palestinian security service people for operating in Occupied Jerusalem. Of those, 66 were arrested for abducting Jerusalem residents and bringing them to Palestinian government territory for questioning. Some of those questioned were suspected land dealers who allegedly sold Arab property in Jerusalem to Israelis. Israel arrested six others for assault and four for possession of illegal weapons.

The Preventive Security of Colonel Rajoub was not the only security force that operated in Occupied Jerusalem. A number of other branches of the Palestinian security have also operated in the city. They include the General Intelligence Service commanded by Amin Al Hindi, the presidential guards (Force 17) and the Jerusalem district security, an organization established by the Palestinian Jerusalem governor, Jamil Othman Nasser. The scope of the various Palestinian security services grew over time until it included guarding the senior officials in the Islamic Waqf, Jerusalem Mufti Sheikh Akrameh Sabri and Faisal Husseini. Klein's study claims that a number of Palestinian offices and institutions in Jerusalem are being guarded at present by security personnel from the Palestinian government. Among those, he names the Al Aqsa Mosque, the offices of Fatah youth branch, better known as the Shabiba, and the clubs of the Palestinian Prisoners and the Palestinian Wounded. He notes that the activity of the Palestinian security services in Jerusalem is camouflaged by working from civil offices, and is able to take place because the local residents accept their authority.

The study notes that in addition to activities of the security services in Occupied Jerusalem, the Palestinian government has intensified its role in strengthening national institutions in the city with the aim of augmenting its control in Jerusalem. The Palestinians continue to build government institutions of their own, as part of the steps to strengthen Palestinian hold on the city, writes Klein in his study. Among the institutions in East Jerusalem, the Palestinians have established professional unions such as unions for the engineers, economists, journalists, lawyers, nurses, doctors, pharmacists, artists, writers and farmers; workers unions such as the union for trade and industrialists; charity organizations, welfare organizations, youth organizations as well as sports organizations; councils for education, housing, tourism, health, culture, information, industry and agriculture; women's organizations and an office for statistics and demographics.

The leading institution among those is of course the Orient House, headquarters of the Palestinian negotiating team to Madrid Conference in the early 90s and since then the headquarters of the PLO in Occupied Jerusalem. Klein argues that the Palestinian bodyguards in the building operate with Israel's approval. Nonetheless, Israel does not allow Orient House guards to bear arms or act outside the building. In reaction to this, Orient House decided to forbid Israeli guards who accompany foreign ministers and guests from overseas to escort them when they visit East Jerusalem.

Klein's study says that the Orient House does not only act like a political focal point, but is the address for Palestinians in East Jerusalem who have problems with the Israeli authorities: Obtaining licenses, IDs and work permits, discounts in taxes and water, and handling requests for family unification and permission to visit relatives in the Arab states. Orient House is also active in municipal areas like building and renovating schools, developing tourism and the economy in East Jerusalem, as well as legal areas such as arbitrating in civil disputes, land deals, couples disputes, all bypassing Israeli legal system. The Orient House, writes Klein, coordinates requests for financial aid from Palestinian government institutions and private donors for schools, clubs, and charity organizations in East Jerusalem, and mediates between them and the Palestinian government.

In the conclusion on the chapter devoted to Palestinian control of East Jerusalem, Klein writes: "The Palestinians are indeed the weaker party in the field and at the negotiating table, but just as they succeeded in bringing Israel to recognize the PLO and to discuss Jerusalem, so they will succeed in obtaining sovereignty in East Jerusalem , thanks to an aggressive and correct struggle which will enforce this outcome on Israel."

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